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1. INTRODUCTION
The cardiovascular safety risks posed by Vioxx, which were found in tests after
the drug was placed on the market, created public concerns about both a drug's
potential risks even following approval by the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA)' and the existence of risks without labeling to alert the patient's doctor.2
After Vioxx was voluntarily withdrawn, the drug sponsor was sued and found liable
in several products liability cases, based partly on documents showing that the
company's employees were aware of cardiovascular risk signals disclosed neither
1. Before a new drug can be marketed, the FDA must approve the drug as safe and effective. See
21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2000) (providing the grounds for which the FDA may refuse an application for drug
approval).
2. See Becky Bright, Americans Growing Less Confident in FDA ' Job on Safety, Poll Shows,
WALL ST. J. ONLINE, May 24, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SBI14831296787359612.html
(reporting that 36% of those polled in 2006 thought "the agency does a good or excellent job," while
in 2004 56% felt that the agency "did a good or excellent job in [ensuring the] safety and efficacy of
newprescription drugs"); Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Responds to Criticism with New Caution, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 6, 2005, at AL, All (reporting that "[t]he agency once avoided issuing disturbing warnings about
drugs unless studies proved that a risk was certain" but that "[t]he Vioxx withdrawal has been a driving
force for [change] at the agency"). Members of Congress have criticized the FDA, stating that "[w]hen
[the] FDA goes through a 14-month-long period to get a labeling change that both it and its panel of
experts agree is necessary, that shows us that something is wrong." Agriculture, Rural Development,
Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2006: Hearings Before a
Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 109th Cong. 39 (2005) (statement of Rep. Hinchey,
Member, House Comm. on Appropriations).
2008]
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to the agency nor to physicians in the drug's labeling.3 Concerns with the safety of
drugs such as Vioxx led the FDA to request a study by the Institute of Medicine of
the National Academies (TOM) on the Future of Drug Safety (TOM Report). 4 The
report adopted a "vision of a transformed drug safety system" that "has at its core
a lifecycle approach to drug risk and benefit.",
5
The recently enacted Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007
(FDAA)6 renewed the user fees 7 needed to fund a major part of the FDA's drug
program and built on the TOM's recommendation to adopt a risk management
approach to drug risks. The new law makes significant changes to drug regulation
in a number of ways, including authorizing restrictions on the availability of
prescription drugs to doctors who have special training when those restrictions are
needed to ensure safe use of drugs with "known serious risks."' The focus here is
on the legislative changes that deal most directly with the safety issues raised by
Vioxx. These changes present a mixed picture. The agency will now have express
authority to require additional postmarket tests and new warnings,9 but the agency
3. See Alex Berenson, Vioxx Jury Adds More in Damages: Punitive AwardPut at $9 Million, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 12,2006, at C4 (stating that Merck faces an "uphill legal battle" due to emails showing that
Merck scientists were aware of heart risks posed by Vioxx); Thomas Ginsberg, Ex-CEO Testifies in
Vioxx Trial, PHILA. INQUIRER, Apr. 7,2006, at C 1, C7. See generally Anna Wilde Mathews & Barbara
Martinez, Warning Signs: E-Mails Suggest Merck Knew Vioxx's Dangers at Early Stage, WALL ST. J.,
Nov. 1,2004, at Al (discussing the existence of emails from Merck officials concerning the heart risks
of Vioxx). Merck recently entered into an agreement to settle lawsuits by those who contend Vioxx
caused their cardiovascular injuries. Alex Berenson, Analysts See Merck Victory in Vioxx Deal, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 10, 2007 at Al.
4. INST. OF MED. OF THE NAT'L ACADEMIES, THE FUTURE OF DRUG SAFETY: PROMOTING AND
PROTECTING THE PUBLIC HEALTH (Alina Baciu, Kathleen Stratton & Sheila P. Burke eds, 2006)
[hereinafter 1GM REPORT]: see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., STRENGTHENING DRUG SAFETY (2007),
available at http://www.fda.gov/consumer/features/drugsafety06O7.pdf Recommendations like those
made by the IOM can be seen as an extension of systems analysis to the area of drug use as a way to
reduce harm, an approach that has become important in other areas of health care. See generally INST.
OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 17 (Linda T. Kohn, Janet M. Corrigan
& Molla S. Donaldson eds., 2000) (proposing "a comprehensive approach for reducing medical errors
and improving patient safety ... [by employing] market and regulatory strategies, public and private
strategies, and strategies that are implemented inside health care organizations as well as in their
external environment").
5. IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 4.
6. Pub. L. No. 110-85, 121 Stat. 823 (2007) (designating renewed user fees). While the FDAA
has delayed effective dates for some of its provisions, this factor is not discussed here. The statute grants
authority to implement the new law to the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the Secretary
has redelegated this authority to the Commissioner ofFood and Drugs. See U.S. FOOD& DRUG ADMIN.,
FDA STAFF MANUAL GUIDE, VOLUME I -DELGATIONS OF AUTHORITY § 1410.10 (2007), available at
http://www.fda.gov/smg/vol2/1410/1410 10.html. In light of this delegation, this Article refers to the
FDA or the agency in implementing the law.
7. Sec. 103, § 736(a), 121 Stat. at 826 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379h(a)).
8. Sec. 901(b), § 505, 121 Stat. at 923 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(f)(3)); see IOM
REPORT, supra note 4, at 119 21 (discussing the model for risk management restrictions provided by
those used for Accutane).
9. Sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 923 (to be codified 21 U.S.C. 355(o)(1), (3), (4)); see infra notes
122-24 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 59: 347
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will have to issue regulations and guidance to establish the dispute resolution
procedures needed to implement the authority,'0 a process that could take years."
The agency will be able to impose fines"2 if the sponsor fails to comply with agency
requirements for new tests 3 and warnings. 4 Drug companies will also pay user fees
that will fund an active surveillance system to uncover postmarket drug risks.'"
Drug companies have generally supported such fees, notwithstanding the cost to
them, in order to avoid the delay that would occur in obtaining approval of new
drugs if the FDA were to have fewer reviewers. 6
The first aim of this Article is to survey the changes in the FDA's authority and
to identify ways in which the authority should be implemented to address drug
safety risks. As an initial step, the FDA should consider whether the standards for
clinical testing for chronic use drugs like Vioxx should include more
comprehensive studies or outcome testing, even if the studies are done postmarket.
Providing adequate disclosures that reflect the limits of the testing done for drugs
is also key. These disclosures should reflect the limited safety information provided
by approvals based on surrogate endpoints, 7 undertakings to do new postmarket
studies or surveillance, and the significance of the failure to complete postmarket
studies. While disclosures can be made on the new agency web site to establish
postmarket safety information (Safety Information Web Site), 8 important ones
should be in the physician labeling. If the drugs will be advertised, adequate
disclosures should be made in consumer advertisements about the risks of newly-
approved drugs. However, Congress has not required restrictions similar to the ones
recommended by the IOM Report 9 and has simply called for a report on the use of
a symbol on the drug labeling.20 Another initiative the FDA should undertake to
10. Sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 923 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(f), (o)(4)(F)).
11. See Andrew Bridges, Bush Signs Drug Safety Bill into Law, USA TODAY.COM, Sept. 27,2007,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2007-09-27-3488505295 x.htm (reporting comments by
an FDA official that it may "take years-to implement some of [the new] provisions"); Cathy
Dumbrowski, FDA Reform Bill Could Still Face Administrative Gauntlet After Enactment, THE PINK
SHEET DAILY, Sept. 28, 2007, http://www.fdalegislativewatch.com/2007/09/fda-reform-bi-1 .html; see
also infra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the need for additional procedures to enforce the agency's authority).
12. Sec. 902(b), § 303(f), 121 Stat. at 943 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(4)(A)).
13. Sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 922 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)).
14. Id. (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (o)(4)); see discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
15. Sec. 905(a), § 505(k), 121 Stat. at 944 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(c)); see
discussion infra Part V.A.
16. PETER BARTON HUTT, RICHARD A. MERRILL & LEWIS A. GROSSMAN, FOOD & DRUG LAW
723-24, 678-82 (3d ed. 2007) (providing an overview of the history and reasons for the program).
17. See discussion infra Part V.A C. Surrogate endpoints are "physiological or biochemical
markers that can be . . . quickly and easily measured," and are "predictive of important clinical
outcomes." Bandolier, Surrogate Endpoints, http://www.jr2.ox.ac. uk/bandolier/booth/glossary/
surrog.html (last visited Nov. 8, 2007).
18. Sec. 915, § 505, 121 Stat. at 957 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(r)); see discussion infra
Part V.D.
19. IOMREPORT, supra note 4, at 171.
20. § 904, 121 Stat. at 944. See Part V.F.
2008]
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ensure that consumers are informed about the risks from advertised drugs is to
prohibit the use of reminder advertisements to consumers.2'
The new law will provide access via an FDA web site to summaries of "any
critical issues and disagreements" concerning the approval by all reviewers, along
with the agency's response, once a drug is approved.22 On the other hand, no
provision is made for the disclosure of risk signals found in clinical studies for new
uses of marketed drugs that are still under review, the very situation that occurred
with Vioxx. 23 This Article recommends that there be a disclosure on the agency's
web site within a limited period when such risk signals are discovered in studies of
new uses of marketed drugs that are still under agency review. 24 Required
disclosure in these situations could prompt a faster resolution of an important
pending issue.
This Article recognizes the different positions on whether disclosure about risk
signals and pending reviews is appropriate. One position endorses the authoritative
expert model under which the FDA is the gatekeeper for disclosures, deciding the
content of the disclosure on the labeling based on an exercise of discretion. One
strength of this model is its recognition of the special expertise the FDA possesses
in evaluating risks that involve complex scientific information. This expertise is
based on reports from the FDA's staff of medical reviewers and its special access
to the raw data for clinical studies. This model also protects against the risk that
doctors or their patients will stop using a drug with benefits out of a concern about
a drug's unsubstantiated risks. Two major weaknesses of the authoritative expert
model are the judgmental quality involved in assessing the drug in the face of
uncertainty and the potential for extended negotiations with the drug sponsor.2" This
Article explores a second model for disclosure, referred to as the access model,
which would supplement the traditional model in the case of notable risk signals
such as those found in medical reviews of clinical studies. An access model is also
helpful regarding disclosures about the limits of testing and follow-up monitoring.
The other major aim of this Article is to urge reconsideration of the FDA's
recent statement of its preemption policy,26 a policy that would preclude imposition
of liability not only when a warning addresses a specific risk, but also when there
is a failure to provide warnings "the substance of which had been proposed" to the
agency but had not been required by the agency.27 The FDA has emphasized its role
as an authoritative expert, as opposed to lay jurors, in deciding on the need for
warnings, as well as the need to avoid exaggeration of a risk that could "discourage
21. See discussion infra Part V.F.4.
22. Sec. 916, § 505(1), 121 Star. at 959 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(1)(2)(C)(iii)).
23. See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
24. See discussion infra Part V.E. 1.
25. This latter point is illustrated by the history of Vioxx. See Harris supra note 2; see also
discussion infra Part 1.B.3.
26. Requirements on Content and Format ofLabeling for Human Prescription Drug and Biological
Products, 71 Fed. Reg. 3,921, 3,933-36 (Jan. 24, 2006) [hereinafter Preemption Statement]; see
discussion infra Part VI.
27. Preemption Statement, supra note 26, at 3,936.
[Vol. 59: 347
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appropriate use of a beneficial drug."28 This position is likely to receive more
attention in connection with the Supreme Court's consideration of cases that raise
different aspects of preemption regarding FDA-regulated products. 2
This Article examines the FDA's Preemption Statement from a policy
perspective and recommends that it be withdrawn because it fails to provide
accountability for agency inaction. Under the statement, silence by the agency with
respect to an undisclosed matter that has been "proposed," perhaps only orally,
could preclude a tort suit.30 The difficulties with the Statement are illustrated by
considering how it would have applied during the negotiations over the need for a
warning about the risks from Vioxx. The agency's policy also fails to provide any
access to information about pending issues or the agency's resolution of the matter.
Moreover, the policy does not reinforce the responsibility that a drug's sponsor
should have for providing information about the extent of the risk.
Still, as the FDA has noted in its Preemption Statement, the litigation process
may encourage warnings that the agency may deem unwarranted." Drug sponsors
may also be uncertain about the need for a warning or its form. Products liability
suits are a less-than-ideal vehicle for determining what type of warning is needed
and involve a retrospective determination that the drug sponsor did not do enough.
The agency should adopt a new procedure that sponsors can use when they seek a
definitive determination on whether a warning is needed. Unlike the agency's
present preemption policy, though, the new procedure would provide for publicly
available information about the request, the risk information to support it, and the
agency's response. Under this approach, as an alternative to the present process,
3 2
the sponsor could petition the agency to determine with preemptive effect whether
a warning is needed about new risk information (Disclosure Determination
Petition).33 The sponsor would have to support the petition with the type of
information the agency identifies as needed to evaluate the scope of the risk. After
a limited period of time, the agency would disclose on the agency web site for the
drug that the petition was "under review," thus giving notice of the ongoing
evaluation of the risk signal. 4 This Disclosure Determination Petition process may
have another advantage because it may make it easier for the agency to obtain better
warnings without having to utilize the new statutory authority with its unsettled
28. Id. at 3,935.
29. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85 (2d Cir. 2007) (finding that tort liability was
not precluded by a claim that the sponsor committed fraud ), cert. granted sub nom. Warner-Lambert
Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 31 (Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 06-1498); Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WL
3041078, at 6 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006) (finding that the FDA labeling set a "floor, not a ceiling" and was
nonpreemptive),petitionfor cert. filed, 127 S. Ct. 2451 ( May 21, 2007) (No. 06-1249) (requesting the
Solicitor General's views on granting certiorari); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2006)
(raising the issue of the extent of the express preemption provision regarding medical devices), cert.
granted, 127 S. Ct. 3000 (June 25, 2007) (No. 06-179); see discussion infra Part VI.
30. See discussion infra Part VI.B.1.
31. Preemption Statement, supra note 26, at 3,935.
32. See discussion infra Part VI.A-D.
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scope. This process would also serve a regulatory interest in resolving the issue
with more accountability and would be a more suitable "preemption-worthy federal
policy" than the agency's present approach.2
Some may object to the suggestions made in this Article for expanding the
scope of the disclosures to physicians. These objections include concerns that the
information may unduly alarm doctors about uncertain risks and cause a decreased
use of drugs that may have important benefits.36 There may also be concerns about
overloading physicians with information. However, the suggestions made here
would place the risk signals in a separate part of the physician labeling or the
agency's Safety Information Web Site. Others may believe that more testing, as
opposed to more disclosures, is needed to protect the public. While more testing
may well be needed in some cases, the aim here is to ensure that, at a minimum,
adequate disclosures are made.
The discretionary nature of decisions about drug risks supports the idea of
providing better access to information on important pending issues. The IOM found
that the "risk-benefit analysis that currently goes into regulatory decisions" varies
among review divisions and appears "ad hoc, informal, and qualitative. 3 7 Other
commentators have pointed out that FDA decisionmaking is decentralized and that
"policy is largely made at the lowest levels of FDA rather than at the top."38 An
FDA guidance document also described the FDA's role in making decisions on
when to act on emerging risks as "a matter of judgment, about which reasonable
people with relevant experience may disagree."'3 9
Given the judgmental nature of the evaluation, two important issues arise: (1)
whether physicians should have access to information on risk signals that can lead
to reasonable differences in assessing the seriousness of a potential risk and (2)
whether there is a satisfactory way to identify which risk signals are reliable
indicators of important potential risks. The underlying issue is whether decisions
balancing a drug's benefits against its emerging risks are best made by the agency,
after negotiations with the drug sponsor and sometimes with input from an advisory
committee in meetings which may be closed on occasion. 4 This Article suggests
35. Richard A. Nagareda, FDA Preemption: When Tort Law Meets the Administrative State, 1 J.
TORT L. 4, 54 (2006); see also Richard A. Epstein, Why the FDA Must Preempt Tort Litigation: A
Critique of Chevron Deference and a Response to Richard Nagareda, 1 J. TORT L. 5, 1 (2006)
(supporting a federal policy of preemption of"state tort actions for pharmaceuticals ... under current
law and as a matter of sound legal policy").
36. See Preemption Statement, supra note 26, at 3,935 (discussing the FDA's concern about the
impact of the current policy in discouraging use of beneficial drugs).
37. IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 123. The panel recommended use of a .'value-of-information'
approach" for determining priorities. Id. at 125.
38. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 19.
39. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE: DRUG SAFETY INFORMATION FDA's
COMMUNICATION TO THE PUBLIC 4 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/CDER/guidance/
7477fin.pdf [hereinafter DSI GUIDANCE].
40. See 21 U.S.C. § 355(n) (2000) (requiring that the FDA establish panels of experts to provide
"expert scientific advice and recommendations ... regarding a clinical investigation of a drug or the
approval for marketing of a drug"); HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 723-24 (providing
[Vol. 59: 347
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that providing physicians with more information about notable risk signals that are
under agency review leaves the choice on how to balance a drug's emerging risks
against its benefits not only with the agency but also with the physicians, who can
use the information to guide their patients.
To explore this matter, Part 11 will provide a short history of Vioxx for its
relevance in prompting the legislative changes and in providing a concrete setting
for identifying the factors that can indicate the need for more disclosures about
risks. Part II1 summarizes the findings of the 1OM that bear on this Article,
including the reasons why premarket testing of drugs is not adequate to identify the
risks that patients may encounter during use. Part III also examines the IOM's
recommendation for a risk management approach to deal with these limits. Part IV
notes the most relevant features of the new drug reform legislation, including the
provisions on an active surveillance system and the new authority to require
postmarket tests and labeling changes.
Part V suggests improvements that should be considered in disclosures about
the limits of testing, including the potential for newly-approved drugs in particular
to have unknown risks. Part V also describes some key changes that should be
considered in the consumer advertising of drugs to ensure adequate risk disclosure.
Part VI examines the reasons why the FDA's preemption policy should be
reexamined to promote the accountability of the agency, reinforce the sponsor's
responsibilities, and provide physicians with access to information on important
risk signals. Part VII concludes by maintaining that the measures proposed in this
Article would help ensure that the safety risks are acknowledged and that the
physician has access to information about important risk signals. These
improvements promote better consideration of a drug's risks by the agency and
physicians in their decisionmaking. Part VII also concludes by adding some final
observations on how the periodic need to renew user fees can affect the
relationships between a regulatory agency and the political branches of the
government and lead to compromise legislation.
II. OVERVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF VIOXX AND SIMILAR DRUGS
This Part gives a short history of Vioxx in order to identify the lessons it
provides on the need for disclosures. Particular attention is given to the risk signals
reported in medical reviews and the adequacy of surrogate endpoints to identify
risks.
an overview of FDA use of advisory committees and the criteria for nondisclosure of committee
materials); see also Tri-Bio Laboratories Inc. v. United States, 856 F.2d 135, 136, 138 (3d Cir. 1987)
(upholding, in the context of a new animal drug, the FDA's position that unpublished safety and
effectiveness data on drugs are confidential business information that may not be disclosed until the
agency determines that the data are not needed to support approval); FDA Notice, Arthritis Advisory
Comm. Meeting, Notice of Meeting, 66 Fed. Reg. 58,745 (Nov. 23, 2001) (announcing that a portion
of the meeting would be closed to consider a matter of "some urgency").
2008]
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A. Initial Approval
1. Basis
The FDA initially approved Vioxx simply for arthritis pain relief, based on
placebo testing.4I The hope was that Vioxx and the other Cox-2 drugs, such as
Celebrex, were "Super Aspirins" that could provide the same relief as other pain
relievers being used for arthritis pain but without the serious risk of stomach
bleeding from chronic use.42
The FDA allowed Merck to make a statement on the drug's label about "special
studies" that showed that treatment with Vioxx, as compared to treatment with
ibuprofen, had reduced the number of gastroduodenal ulcers, as shown through a
scope test.4' The FDA did not believe a "surrogate indicator" like this was sufficient
to support a claim that Vioxx causes fewer cases of stomach bleeding and required
a warning that a long-term clinical outcome study had not been done.44 A similar
statement was permitted for Celebrex, another Cox-2 drug, and the FDA required
a similar warning about stomach bleeding.45
2. Cardiovascular Risks in the Medical Reviewer's Report
The possibility that Vioxx was linked to cardiovascular risks was raised in the
medical review before Vioxx was first approved.46 The reviewer gave the following
comments:
"The most frequent serious adverse events were of the
cardiovascular body system in all study groupings. With the
available data, it is impossible to answer with complete certainty
whether the risk of cardiovascular.., events is increased .... A
41. See PHYSICIANS' DESI REFERENCE 1912-13 (54th ed. 2000) [hereinafter PDR].
42. See FDA, Alerck, and Vioxx: Putting Patient Safety First?9: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Finance, 108th Cong. 50 (2004) [hereinafter S. Finance Comm. Hearing] (statement of Dr. Sandra L.
Kweder, Acting Director, Office ofNew Drugs, Food and Drug Administration) (stating that Vioxx and
other drugs "held out tremendous hope for reducing the substantial morbidity and mortality associated
with GI bleeding and ulcers from this class of drugs"); David L. DeWitt, Cox-2-Selective Inhibitors:
The New Super Aspirins, 55 MOLECULAR PHARMACOLOGY 625, 625 (1999). For more background on
the regulatory history and the need for changes in the FDA's statutory procedures, see generally
Margaret Gilhooley, Vioxx's History and the Needfor Better Procedures and Better Testing, 37 SETON
HALL L. REV. 941 (2007) (examining procedural issues and the value of comparative efficacy testing
in light of the experience with Vioxx).
43. PDR, supra note 41, at 1913.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 2902 03.
46. Documents found during litigation, after Vioxx had been withdrawn, indicated that there were
reasons, based on biological evidence, that led at least one Merck scientist to believe there was a
theoretical risk. See Mathews & Martinez, supra note 3, at Al.
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larger database will be needed to answer this and other safety
comparison questions. 47
When Dr. Sandra Kweder testified for the FDA before the Senate Finance
Committee about the decisionmaking process in the approval of Vioxx, she was
asked why the labeling did not reflect this potential cardiovascular risk.48 She
accepted the characterization that the information was a "theoretical concern" but
not "an evidentiary concern. ' '49 The fact that later studies showed a cardiovascular
risk led to more attention on the need to disclose risk signals and other issues raised
by medical reviewers.5"
B. Postapproval Submission for a New Indication
1. Benefit Found
After Vioxx was approved, Merck completed and submitted to the FDA the
VIGOR study, which represented the type of testing the agency wanted.5 The New
England Journal of Medicine published an article about the study before it was
submitted to the FDA, 2 and its publication undoubtedly made physicians more
aware of the drug's potential benefit and expanded use of the drug as well. The
VIGOR study actually confirmed that the drug reduced gastrointestinal bleeding
when compared to naproxen, the standard arthritis treatment.53
2. Cardiovascular Risk Findings and the Medical Reviewer's Report
The FDA's medical review of the study found, however, that serious
cardiovascular events occurred more frequently among the Vioxx users at the high
dose used in the tests a dose twice the size than that intended for long-term
chronic use.54 In February 2001, the medical reviewer concluded that "there is an
47. U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., Vioxx: EXCERPTS FROM PRIMARY REVIEW OF NDA 21-
042-OSTEOARTHIIs 2.6.1.1(a) (1999), available athttp:// wv.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/05/briefing/
2005-4090BI 05 F-FDA-Tab-D- l.pdf(emphasis omitted) (reporting the comments ofreviewer Maria
Lourdes Villalba).
48. S. Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 42, at 61 (statement of Sen. Breaux, Member, Senate
Comm. on Finance).
49. Id. at 61 (statement of Dr. Sandra L. Kweder, Acting Director, Office of New Drugs, Food
and Drug Administration).
50. See Part V.E.I 2.
51. S. Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 42, at 46 (statement of Dr. Gurkipal Singh, Adjunct
Clinical Professor of Medicine, Stanford University School of Medicine.).
52. Claire Bombardier et al., Comparison of Upper Gastrointestinal Toxicity of Rofecoxib and
Naproxen in Patients with Rheumatoid Arthritis, 343 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1520 (2000).
53. Id. at 1522.
54. In the VIGOR study, patients received 50 mg of Vioxx per day. Id. at 152 1. The "maximum
recommended daily dose," however, is 25 mg. PDR, supra note 41, at 1915.
2008]
11
Gilhooley: Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Sign
Published by Scholar Commons, 2008
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
increased risk of cardiovascular thrombotic events, particularly myocardial
infarction, in the [Vioxx] group compared with the naproxen group.,1
5
3. Period of Negotiation on the Need for Labeling Disclosures
Merck and the FDA debated for quite some time about whether the result at the
higher dose required any change in the labeling, whether the result was due to a
protective effect of naproxen, and whether cardiovascular-specific testing was
needed.56 Finally, the agency and the company agreed on a precaution stating that
"[t]he significance of the cardiovascular findings" at the higher dose and in two
other studies was "unknown," that caution was needed by those most at risk, and
that prospective studies of the cardiovascular events had not been performed.5 The
extended time that it took to negotiate the revised labeling in the case of Vioxx
influenced legislative proposals to expand the FDA's statutory powers.5 8
4. Subsequent Cardiovascular Findings, Voluntary Withdrawal, and
Class Effect Assessments
The last part of the Vioxx story relates to another clinical study, known as the
APPROVe study. This study was undertaken to determine if Vioxx could help
prevent cancer colon polyps.59 Merck monitored this study to determine the drug's
cardiovascular effects.6" When this study showed statistically significant
cardiovascular effects at the low dose, Merck voluntarily removed Vioxx from the
market, regarding that study as "[t]he first definitive data" that demonstrated a
higher cardiovascular risk,6 because it was performed as a "randomized controlled
clinical trial" and therefore was "the most persuasive evidence.' 62
55. Memorandum from Shari L. Targum, FDA Medical Officer, to Sandra Cook, FDA Project
Manager, and Maria L. Villalba, FDA Medical Officer, 34 (Feb. 1, 2001), available at
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/O1/briefing/3677b2 06 cardio.pdf
56. See S. Finance Comm Hearing, supra note 42, at 59 (statement of Dr. Sandra L. Kweder,
Acting Director, Office ofNew Drugs, Food and Drug Administration) (stating that the labeling change
took "a very long time, much longer than usual"); Harris, supra note 2, at Al I (reporting as an
explanation for delay that the "F.D.A. does not own a drug's label, drug makers do. Short of threatening
to seize a drug if a label is not changed, the agency must negotiate with drug makers over any change.
This can lead to delays").
57. PHYSICIANS' DESK REFERENCE 2110 (58th ed. 2004). The revised labeling provided that
"caution should be exercised when VIOXX is used in patients with a medical history of ischemic heart
disease" and that further testing had not been done. See S. Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 42, at
42 43 (statement of Dr. Sandra L. Kweder, Acting Director, Office of New Drugs, Food and Drug
Administration).
58. Harris, supra note 2, at A 1.
59. S. Finance Comm Hearing, supra note 42, at 62 (statement of Dr. Sandra L. Kweder, Acting
Director, Office of New Drugs, Food and Drug Administration).
60. Id. at 163 (prepared statement of Dr. Sandra L. Kweder).
61. Id. at 69 (statement of Raymond V. Gilmartin, Charman, President, and CEO, Merck & Co.).
62. Id. at 88 (prepared statement of Raymond V. Gilmartin).
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The FDA responded with a "Public Health Advisory" that recommended
limited use of Celebrex and non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug products
(NSAIDS), including naproxen. 3 Later, the FDA found that the data were "best
interpreted" as showing "a class effect" for Celebrex, as well as other NSAID
painkillers like naproxen, and called for "Black Box" warnings-the strictest
warning label-to be added to all these drugs about their potential for
cardiovascular effects.64 By that time, cardiovascular risks had been found in a
cancer prevention study of Celebrex, 5 resolving a debate on whether the
cardiovascular events should be considered a class effect for this drug.
C. Lessons for Disclosures and the Debate on the Need for Organizational
Independence of Safety Decisions
1. Criteria for Warnings
It is notable that Merck had such a demanding test for determining an adequate
basis for a warning, withdrawing the drug only when a clinical study found risks
at the normal dosage level.66 Moreover, the FDA's VIGOR warning, based on an
extrapolation from a clinical study using a higher dose, came after a long
negotiation.
A test like Merck's that requires clinical findings before the drug sponsor will
implement warnings fails to protect the public adequately because of the inherent
limits on detecting risks of drugs in clinical testing.67 Adequate weight must be
given to other evidence, including extrapolations from clinical studies.6"
2. Weight of Observational Studies and Organizational Changes
At a congressional hearing on Vioxx, an FDA drug safety officer criticized the
agency for giving insufficient weight to epidemiological studies and characterized
63. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Public Health Advisory, Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflammatory Drug
Products (NSAIDS) (Dec. 23, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/advisory/nsaids.htm (last visited
Oct. 27, 2007); see U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Issues Public Health Advisory Recommending
Limited Use of Cox-2 lnhibitors (Dec. 23, 2004), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/ANSWERS/2004/
ANS01336.html.
64. Memorandum from John K. Jenkins, Director, FDA Office of New Drugs, and Paul J.
Seligman, Director, Office ofPharmacoepidemiology and Statistical Science, to NDA files 20-998, 21-
156, 21-341, 21-042, at 2 (Apr. 6, 2005), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/drug/infopage/cox2/
nsaiddecisionmemo.pdf [hereinafter Decision Memorandum].
65. See Decision Memorandum, supra note 64, at 4; Barry Meier et al., Medicine Fueled by
Marketing Intensified Troublefor Pain Pills, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2004, at NI.
66. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
67. See discussion infra Part III.
68. The FDA's criteria for warnings about a "clinically significant hazard" provide that they
should be given "as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association with a drug; a causal
relationship need not have been definitely established." 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(6) (2007).
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the regulatory system as being "broken."6 9 The FDA had placed less weight on the
findings from the observational study, considering it less valuable because the
study did not identify which patients were taking aspirin or whether the Vioxx
patients were already at a higher risk.71 The testimony72 also led to proposals for
organizational changes that would allow decisions regarding drug safety to be made
independently.7"
111. 1OM REPORT ON LIMITS OF TESTING AND RISK MANAGEMENT
This Part focuses on the aspects of the 1OM Report that relate to the limits of
testing and the way risk information can be identified and evaluated before and
after approval. The discussion starts with the scope of the testing currently done to
support the approval of drugs and the existing postmarket surveillance techniques.
The discussion then turns to the recommendations made by the 1OM about
postmarket testing and active surveillance of risks. This background illuminates the
types of disclosures that should be considered for drugs.
A. Limits of Premarket Testing and Criteria for the Scope of Testing
In a 1999 report, an FDA task force noted that preapproval trials for drugs used
on a chronic basis rarely identify long-term effects because "often no more than a
few hundred individuals use the product for 6 months or longer."74 Despite this
problem, "[c] linical trial investigators [still] expect the majority of severe toxicities
to be detected through.., animal studies" and current trials.75 The protocol designs
also "reflect decades-long experience . ..analyzing what can reasonably be
achieved during clinical investigations, and carefully considering the practical
69. S. Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 42, at 13, 15-16 (statement of Dr. David J. Graham,
Associate Director for Science, Office of Drug Safety, Food and Drug Administration). Dr. Graham
went on to criticize the "world view" present in the office that approves drugs that believes "only
randomized clinical trials provide useful and actionable information." Id. at 16.
70. See Decision Memorandum, supra note 64, at 7.
71. See S. Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 42, at 163 (prepared statement of Dr. Sandra L.
Kweder).
72. See id. at 15 (statement of Dr. David J. Graham, Associate Director for Science, Office of
Drug Safety, Food and Drug Administration) (objecting to the view that the Office of Drug Safety
should not "reach any conclusions or make any recommendations" without concurrence from the Office
for New Drugs).
73. See Phil B. Fontanarosa, Drummond Rennie & Catherine D. DeAngelis, Postmarketing
Surveillance Lack of Vigilance, Lack of Trust, 292 JAMA 2647, 2649 (2004).
74. TASK FORCE ON RISK MGMT., MANAGING THE RISKS FROM MEDICAL PRODUCT USE:
CREATING A RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK 43-44 (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/tfrm/
riskmanagement.pdf [hereinafter MANAGING THE RISKS].
75. Id. at 44.
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ability of manufacturers and clinical investigators to regularly conduct large-scale
trials. 76
The recent TOM Report recognizes the limits of preapproval clinical trials and
pointed out that "[p]remarket clinical trials are designed primarily with efficacy,"
not safety outcomes, in mind.77 The tests may provide little information about long-
term exposure because of their short duration and because they "usually do not
represent the full array of patients who will use the [drug]," including those who are
sick. 78 The 1OM found that, as a result of the limits, "the safety profile of a [new
drug] . . . is especially uncertain" at the time of approval.79 These limitations,
though, "are inherent in the system and cannot be changed without adding
considerably to the time and expense of drug approvals," including approvals for
beneficial drugs.80 The 1OM responds to these limitations by emphasizing the need
for improvements in postmarket surveillance and recommending that the FDA have
the authority to require additional postmarket trials or observational studies when
needed." The scope of the testing and surveillance must "match the specific safety
concerns and benefits presented by the drug product." 2 The 1OM also recommends
that the FDA develop a systematic approach and use risk-benefit analysis, rather
than continue to use the ad hoc approach that appears to guide its decisions. 3 Under
these recommendations, the scope of the testing depends on a balance of factors,
rather than a bright-line test with a minimum time length and defined parameters,
depending on the category of the drug.
B. Difficulties of Postmarket Surveillance and Means ofImprovement
Given the limits ofpreapproval testing, the TOM emphasizes the importance of
postmarket surveillance in detecting risks not found in the clinical trials. There also
are drawbacks, though, to the existing passive postmarket surveillance system. The
present system largely depends upon spontaneous adverse event reports.8 4 This
approach monitors rare side effects, but not those side effects that are common in
the population,85 such as heart problems.
The TOM recognizes the need for an active postmarket surveillance system,86
which could transform drug regulation. The first step, aimed at signal generation,
76. Id. These testing standards are consistent with those of the International Conference on
Harmonization. Id. at 43, n. 10.
77. IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 38.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 106.
80. Id. at 38.
81. Id. at 169.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 123, 125.
84. Id. at 108. This "part-voluntary, part-mandatory" system combines reports from physicians
and drug manufacturers regarding serious or unexpected adverse reactions to drugs. Id.
85. Id. at 108 09.
86. Id. at 7.
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would improve the means of detecting adverse events and increase the use of
statistical surveillance systems.8 7 The next step would improve the "formulation and
testing" of hypotheses about risks,8" including improving access to health care
databases to test the hypotheses and implementing "active surveillance" of specific
drugs when needed. 9 If these means do not adequately identify risks, observational
or clinical trials may be necessary. 90
The development of a systematic approach presents some obstacles, however,
because the methods of risk detection are still evolving and data may be missing
due to the limits of the preclinical testing and the use of surrogate indicators. 9' In
cases where a risk signal is "apparent but uncertain," additional studies should be
done to "reduce the uncertainty" about the risk.92 A "'value of the information'
approach" is suggested for determining the priority of further research studies.93
The results ofany analysis should be made "available to patients, physicians, policy
makers, and researchers" to guide their decisions.94 The 10M also recommends a
risk-management approach to risks, as well as steps to strengthen the agency's
authority, such as the ability to impose fines.95
C. Confirmatory Testing
The 1GM suggests that large-scale confirmatory tests are needed regarding
important public health matters, even though the cost may be high.96 The 1OM also
recommends a public-private partnership to prioritize the studies and advises that
"Congress should capitalize the public share of this partnership." 97 Regarding the
responsibilities of the drug companies, the 10M recommends that they pay for
clinical trials and observational studies needed for drug approval as part of their
"specific postmarket study commitments." 98
87. See id. at 10.
88. Id. at 114.
89. Id. at 114 15.
90. Id. at 169.
91. Id. at 124 25.
92. Id. at 125.
93. Id. This approach prioritizes research studies based on "the expected value of the
improvements in outcomes." Id.
94. Id. at 126.
95. Id. at 170. For a discussion of mechanisms that may increase FDA authority, see infra Part
IV.B.
96. See id. at 117.
97. Id. at 8.
98. Id. at 118-19. The IOM notes that the FDA does not consider cost-effectiveness. Id. at 126
n. 14. The IOM further recommends that the FDA have the authority to adopt risk minimization action
plans to reduce risks when other steps fail to do so. Id. at 119-21. These plans typically place limits on
the distribution of drugs. The FDA used such a plan to limit the distribution of the acne drug Accutane
because of birth defects caused by the drug. Id.
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IV. LEGISLATIVE CHANGES TO STRENGTHEN FDA AUTHORITY
This Part provides an overview of some important legislative changes that have
been enacted in response to the lessons learned from Vioxx, as well as the
recommendations in the TOM Report. The new law provides for the development
of an active surveillance system to determine adverse drug risks. The FDA can now
require risk evaluation and minimization strategies and has express authority to
require postmarket tests and safety warnings. The agency can also impose civil
money penalties for violations of the law, which will make it a more powerful
regulator but only after implementing procedures are established. The new law is
complex, though, and it is difficult to decipher exactly how the different provisions
work together. At this point, only a general guide can be provided as to its overall
impact and applicability.
A. Support for Active Electronic Surveillance of Postmarket Risks:
A Technological Fix?
An important change made by the new law, and perhaps its most important
change, is the support provided to establish an electronic active surveillance system
for postmarket drug risks. In response to the recommendation of the 1OM, Congress
directed the agency to establish an active surveillance program,99 a process
sometimes referred to informally as "data-mining."' 00 User fees paid by the drug
companies will be used to support the new reporting system. 1 1 The agency is to
develop the program using data from federal programs like Medicare and, when
available, electronic programs of private health insurance companies. 102 The first
step is to develop methods to access and link the data from multiple sources.
Congress contemplates that the system will cover records of 100,000,000 patients
by 2012.03 That is about one-third of the country. A system of this magnitude could
have implications for wider use of electronic information in health care generally.
Appropriately enough, the law calls for compliance with laws that protect the
privacy of the patient records. °4
99. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, sec. 905(a),
§ 505(k), 121 Stat. 823, 945 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(III)).
100. IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 114.
101. § 905(d), 121 Stat. at 949.
102. Sec. 905(a), § 505(k), 121 Stat. at 945 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(1)); see
also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE FUTURE OF DRUG
SAFETY-PROMOTING AND PROTECTING THE HEALTH OF THE PUBLIC: FDA's RESPONSE TO THE
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE'S 2006 REPORT 8 9 (2007), available at http://www.fda.gov/oc/reports/
iom01 3007.pdf [hereinafter FDA'S RESPONSE] (describing plans to strengthen "methods and tools of
safety surveillance," including expanding access to database resources such as the Medicare Part D and
developing guidance on using pharmacoepidemiological studies of large health care databases).
103. Sec. 905(a), § 505(k), 121 Stat. at 944 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(B)(ii)(J)).
104. Id. at 945 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(k)(3)(C)(i)(I)).
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If the new surveillance system works as expected, it could provide a
"technological fix" to the problems in detecting drug risks, as seen in the
experience with Vioxx. The potential for success of this system raises scientific and
technical issues beyond the scope of this Article. Furthermore, the agency would
seem to need more experience with the system before an adequate assessment can
be made ofthe potential for success. The impact ofthe system, though, goes beyond
simply providing better adverse event reporting. Indeed, under the new law, the
agency must consider whether active surveillance would be sufficient to detect
adverse events before it can require postmarket studies.1 5 Active surveillance is
likely to be much less expensive than clinical or other studies, but whether the
surveillance methods are as effective is an important issue. Thus, the agency should
make periodic public assessments of the strengths and weaknesses of the new
surveillance system and the extent to which the system should replace the use of
postmarket safety studies. Such a report would receive more attention from
scientists and physicians than decisions dealing with particular cases.
B. Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) and Postapproval
Study and Labeling Requirements
1. REMS Provisions
When a drug is initially approved, drug sponsors can now be required to have
a risk evaluation and mitigation strategy (REMS) 1°6 regarding postmarket safety
when the agency finds that the strategy is needed "to ensure that the benefits of the
drug outweigh the risks."' 7 The agency can require manufacturers of drugs that
have already been approved to have a REMS plan if newly available information
shows that the strategy is needed to ensure that the drug's benefits outweigh its
risks. ' 8 While this new authority helps to implement the risk management
recommendations in the IOM Report, this Article focuses on the special standards
that apply to requirements for postmarket testing and labeling.
2. New Authority for Postmarket Studies and Labeling and the Need to
Determine Procedures
A separate provision gives the agency the specific authority to require
postmarket clinical or other studies, an authority the agency did not expressly have
when the Vioxx issues arose.'0 9 Now the agency can require additional testing after
the drug is on the market, but only if the risk relates to "new safety information"'' 0
105. Sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 923 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(D)).
106. Id. at 926 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(p)(1)(B)).
107. Sec. 901(b), ch. V, 121 Stat. at 926 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(1)).
108. Id. at 927 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(a)(2)(A)).
109. Sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 922 26 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o) (p)).
110. Id. at 923 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(C)).
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and if the risk is a serious one."' The existence of a serious risk can be based not
only on information found in clinical trials" 2 but also on other tests presumably
including observational studies" 3 -as well as adverse event reports" 4 that involve
death, hospitalization, incapacity,"' or "other scientific data deemed appropriate"
by the agency." 6 However, the agency must find that active postmarket surveillance
would not be effective before tests can be required."' In addition, the agency must
find that other trials would not be sufficient before it can require clinical trials."'
Despite these prerequisites, this new authority to require postmarket testing has the
potential to be a major improvement in the scope of the agency's ability to require
new testing. An important caveat, though, is that the law requires that dispute
resolution procedures govern the new authority, but the procedures are not specified
in the law." 9 Rather, they are to be determined by the agency by "regulation and
guidance.""' The implementation, though, may take some time, and it may well be
that a new administration, to be elected in 2008 and appointed in 2009, will make
the procedural decisions that will enable full use of this substantive authority.'
2 1
In another important provision that responds to the lessons of Vioxx, the drug
sponsor can now specifically be required to make safety labeling changes,
122
ranging from boxed warnings to adverse reaction reports. 123 Again, though, the
dispute resolution procedures are left to be determined by the agency. 24 Of course,
the new procedural requirements should not be implemented or interpreted in a way
that would impose procedural hurdles similar to those that existed before the
legislative change was made.
C. Strengthened Enforcement Measures
The new law strengthens the agency's enforcement authority by permitting
civil money penalties if a drug sponsor fails to comply with an order pursuant to a
dispute resolution proceeding that orders postapproval testing or a safety labeling
111. Sec. 901(b), § 505-1, 121 Stat. at 927 28 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(3)(A)).
112. Id. at 928 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(6)(A)).
113. See id. (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(6)(C)).
114. Id. (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(6)(B)).
115. Id. (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(4)(A)).
116. Id. (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355-1(b)(6)(F)).
117. Sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 923 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(D)(i)).
118. Id. (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(D)(ii)). The provision raises other issues, such
as whether monitoring like that done by Merck in the APPROVe study would have to be taken into
account before a new clinical trial could be required. See discussion supra Part ll.B.4.
119. Id. at 924 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(F)).
120. Id. For a summary of the experience with Vioxx and observations on the implementation on
the procedures, see Gilhooley, supra note 42.
121. See Bridges, supra note 11.
122. Sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 924 26 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)); see
discussion supra Part ll.B.3.
123. Sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 924 25 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(B)(i)).
124. Id. at 924-26 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(F)).
2008]
19
Gilhooley: Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Sign
Published by Scholar Commons, 2008
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
change. 12 5 These violations can also be remedied byjudicial enforcement measures,
such as an injunction'26 or a seizure action,'2 7 but the use of this additional express
authority allows for appeals through an agency dispute resolution process.' As
already noted, the agency must establish the procedures to govern the dispute
resolution procedures through agency "regulation and guidance."' 2 9
V. AGENCY IMPLEMENTATION: TESTING STANDARDS, DISCLOSURES, AND
CONSUMER ADVERTISEMENTS
The limits of drug testing create the potential that unknown risks may exist, and
such risks may be found only through the observation of patients and postmarket
testing and surveillance. Given the problems that occurred with the testing of
Vioxx, the first step the FDA should consider is the adequacy of the criteria used
to evaluate the scope of the clinical testing. This Part begins with a discussion of
the adequacy of the testing criteria and the need for disclosures regarding the limits
on testing, the use of surrogate endpoints, and specific commitments for
postapproval testing and surveillance. This Part also considers the extent to which
disclosures on the agency's new Safety Information Web Site provide a suitable
format for disclosures. Additionally, this Part examines the need for disclosures in
consumer advertisements about the special risks posed by newly approved drugs.
The discussion closes with a survey of FDA authority to require labeling
disclosures.
A. Scope of the Testingfor Chronic Use Drugs and the Relevant Criteria
A medical expert, who was also a member of the 1OM panel that produced the
TOM Report, testified in a 2004 Senate hearing that the initial testing for Vioxx,
while adequate to determine pain relief, was not "adequate to evaluate side effects,"
such as heart attacks, that were common in those that used the drug on a chronic
basis. 30 The same expert later criticized the pending legislation because it did not
require sponsors of drugs similar to Vioxx in their level of distribution and duration
of use, approved on the basis of a surrogate indicator, to either perform postmarket
125. Sec. 902(b)(1), § 303(f), 121 Star. at 943 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(4)). For more
background on the procedures and a more complete explanation of the experience with Vioxx, see
Gilhooley, supra note 42.
126. 21 U.S.C. § 332 (2000).
127. Id. § 334 (as amended by Pub. L. No. 110-85, § 912(b)(1), 121 Stat. 823, 952 (2007)).
128. Sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 924, 925 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(o)(3)(F),
(o)(4)(F)) (permitting an appeal from an agency determination that either an additional study or clinical
trial is needed or a labeling change is required).
129. See id. at 924 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(F)) (allowing for an appeal using
procedures to be established by the agency).
130. S. Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 42, at 18 (statement of Dr. Bruce M. Psaty, Professor,
Medicine and Epidemiology, University of Washington). This criticism is similar to the stated
drawbacks of standard preapproval trials. See MANAGING THE RISKS, supra note 74, at 43-44.
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"large, long-term, randomized clinical trials" to identify the risks or convert the
surrogate indicators into "clinically meaningful outcomes."'
' 3 1
As noted earlier, under FDA standards, only a limited number of individuals
are usually tested for longer than six months for drugs used on a chronic basis by
large numbers of people.'32 One issue raised by the history of Vioxx is whether the
testing standards need to be strengthened; this could be accomplished, for example,
by increasing the minimum number of subjects to be tested for chronic use drugs.
The IOM sets a balancing test for testing procedures that addresses "the specific
safety concerns and benefits" of the drug without specifying rigid testing
requirements for particular categories of drugs. 13 3 The 1OM also recognizes that the
tests could be done before or after marketing.'34
While the adequacy of testing raises scientific issues, the agency should
consider whether it needs to revise its standards for chronic use drugs used by large
numbers of people. Further scientific assessment is needed of the adequacy and
reliability of the active surveillance system that the agency plans to develop to
determine whether the system reduces the need for long-term studies or other types
of testing.'35
B. Disclosures AboutLimits ofSurrogate Endpoints and Chronic Use Testing
If testing for a drug is limited, there should be adequate disclosures. The FDA's
2006 Physician Labeling Regulations (Physician Labeling Rule) provide that if an
indication is based on a surrogate endpoint, the labeling must have "a succinct
description of the limitations of usefulness of the drug and any uncertainty about
anticipated clinical benefits."'36 The emphasis of this rule is on the limits of the
endpoints in determining the efficacy of a drug. While the endpoints may be
sufficient to determine efficacy, they may not be sufficient to detect safety
problems, particularly those that occur as a result of long-term use. The history of
Vioxx provides an illustration of the need for adequate disclosures. If Merck had
relied only on the surrogate indicator provided by the scope test and had not
undertaken a comparative clinical trial to determine if stomach bleeding was
reduced, the cardiovascular risks would not have been uncovered, at least not until
after the subsequent long-term cancer prevention study was done.'37
131. Bruce M. Psaty & Curt D. Furberg, Rosiglitazone and Cardiovascular Risk, 356 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 2522, 2524 (2007).
132. See MANAGING THE RISKS, supra note 74, at 43 44; see also supra Part III.A (discussing
the limits of preapproval testing).
133. See IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 169; see also supra Part III.A (discussing the limits of
preapproval testing).
134. See IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 169.
135. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
136. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(2)(B) (2007).
137. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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In recent years, the FDA has accepted the use of surrogate endpoints in proving
the efficacy for drugs without requiring clinical outcome studies." 8 This policy has
expedited the approval of fast-track drugs, such as drugs used to treat AIDS. 3 9
Moreover, when user fees were required, there also was an "agreement that, in
return for industry paying user fees," the agency "would commit to improved
performance goals" for acting on new drug applications. 40 The use of surrogate
endpoints can help meet these goals, but their ability to detect safety risks is
limited.'14 Because the surrogate indicators do not have the same ability to
determine safety risks as clinical trials do, the disclosures in the labeling should
indicate these limits and whether long-term follow-up studies are being done. The
disclosures can be aimed at indicating the limits of the testing. Another alternative
would be for the agency to develop criteria based on evidence-based medicine to
make disclosures that rank the strength of the existing support for a drug.
142
C. Disclosures on Commitments for Postapproval Tests or Surveillance and
Use of the Web Site
1. Commitments as a Condition of Approval
In practice, when drugs are approved, the drug sponsor may make a
commitment, at the FDA's request, to perform a postmarket test. According to the
10M, though, many of these studies are not completed because of a poor study
138. See 21 U.S.C. § 356(b)(1) (2000) (providing for approval of a fast track product based "on
a surrogate endpoint that is reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit").
139. See Direct to Consumer Advertising (DTC) : Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Consumer
Affairs, Foreign Commerce and Tourism, S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 107th
Cong. 6 (2001) [hereinafter DTC Hearing] (statement of Nancy Ostrove, Deputy Director, Division of
Drug Marketing, Advertising, and Communications, Food and Drug Administration) (stating that DTC
reminder advertisements do "not need to include risk information").
140. HUTT, MERRILL & GROSSMAN, supra note 16, at 679: see also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
WHITE PAPER, PRESCRIPTION DRUG USER FEE ACT (PDUFA): ADDING RESOURCES AND IMPROVING
PERFORMANCE IN FDA REVIEW OF NEW DRUG APPLICATIONS 5 (2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/oc/pdufa/PDUFAWhitePaper.pdf (noting the FDA's commitment to expediting "the
review of new drug applications").
141. See IOM REPORT, supra note 4, at 124 25 (recognizing the potential limits that surrogate
endpoint testing may have).
142. The FDA used an evidence-based rating system adapted from that of the American Diabetic
Association to grade the strength of health claims for foods and nutritional supplements that have
limited support. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA to Encourage Science-Based
Labeling and Competition for Healthier Dietary Choices (July 10, 2003),
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2003/NEW00923.html; U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance
for Industry and FDA, Interim Evidence-Based Ranking System for Scientific Data (July 10, 2003),
http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-dms/hclmgui4.html; see also Margaret Gilhooley, The Impact and Limits
of the Constitutional Deregulation of Health Claims on Foods and Supplements: From Dementia to
Nuts to Chocolate to Saw Palmetto, 56 MERCERL. REV. 683, 694 700 (2005) (discussing the need for
improvements in disclaimers on labels for supplements); Arnold J. Rosoff, Evidence-Based Medicine
and the Law: The Courts Confront Clinical Practice Guidelines, 26 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 327
(2001) (providing an overview of the use of evidence-based medicine).
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design, the difficulties of enrolling patients,"' the lack of FDA power to compel
completion,'44 "high costs," and the fear of "unfavorable results."'45 The status of
the studies is already disclosed in the Federal Register but should now also appear
on the new Safety Information Web Site.'46 If the failure to complete the study
significantly affects the assessment of the safety of the drug, the sponsor and the
agency should provide an appropriate disclosure in the physician labeling as well.
These steps are necessary because patients will still be using the drug while this
postapproval testing and surveillance is being done, and these studies may be the
principal means of discovering risks of chronic use drugs with limited preapproval
testing. Strengthening the FDA's enforcement powers may lead to increased
compliance with these commitments to do postmarket testing.
2. Commitments After Approval
Risks for which the FDA requests the drug sponsor do additional clinical or
observational studies or other types of monitoring should be disclosed, at least on
the agency's web site, when such risks are identified after the drug has been placed
on the market. Disclosing that the FDA has required these follow-up measures
indicates that the agency believes there is a potential risk that cannot be ignored.
Requests for more studies or monitoring also defers resolving the need for a
warning.147
Under the new law, there will be new forms of active surveillance that may
identify issues that present close and novel questions as to whether a warning is
needed or whether further investigation is sufficient.'48 Indeed, there could be a
spectrum of successive follow-up efforts and observational studies that never result
in a warning because the evidence is not considered sufficiently definitive.
Disclosing the pendency of follow-up measures will at least identify the risk as one
worth watching while more research is done to determine if the risk is serious
enough to require a warning.
143. See 10M REPORT, supra note 4, at 49-50 (pointing out that commitments made by drug
companies when a drug is initially approved may not be fulfilled because the commitments are often
sought late in the process and may prove "infeasible or unjustified for a variety of reasons" including
difficulty in recruiting patients).
144. Id. at H15.
145. Id. at 116.
146. See 21 U.S.C. 356b(c)-(d) (2000 & Supp. 11 2002) (providing for reports in the Federal
Register and on the agency's Internet site); see also supra text accompanying note 18 (discussing
establishment of a new Safety Information Web Site).
147. Indeed, the Vioxx situation involved an undertaking by the drug company to continue to
monitor an ongoing study; this monitoring revealed a cardiovascular risk. See discussion supra Part
II.B.4.
148. See discussion supra Part IVA.
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D. Format for Active Surveillance Reporting
1. Present Reporting ofAdverse Events: Passive Surveillance
Under the FDA's present regulations on postmarketing requirements, there is
a separate section for "adverse reactions" that are "reasonably associated with use
of a drug."' 14 9 Adverse reactions must be disclosed, even if causation has not been
"definitely established.' 150 The reports are to be presented in a tabular form that
permits an overview of their relevance and seriousness.
151
2. Observational Studies, Active Surveillance, and the Role of the Web
Site for Disclosures
Unfortunately, no provision is made in the present labeling requirements for the
reporting of risks found in epidemiological or observational studies. While these
studies are more limited in their ability to determine causation as compared to the
abilities of clinical trials, they appear to be more reliable and significant than
passive adverse event reports.
The new law does, however, require the agency to establish a new web site on
postmarket safety information (Safety Information Web Site) to provide better
access for patients and providers. 152 Furthermore, summaries of the active
surveillance data on known serious side effects and unusual increases in risks or
new types of risks must appear on the web site. 5 3 This web site is an important
development in making this information accessible to the general public.
The development of the Safety Information Web Site raises the issue of
whether the suggested disclosures regarding the pendency of specific postmarket
studies and potential risk signals should be made on the web site or whether the
disclosures should be contained in the physician labeling. Placing notices in the
labeling better ensures ready access of information to the physician, but overload
of information would be a concern. In this electronic age, the web site could be a
useful means for providing disclosure on less essential matters without the risk of
overload on the official labeling. For the web site to be an adequate source for
relevant information, though, the printed version of the sponsor's official labeling
should reference the availability of more information on risk signals on the FDA's
web site, and the electronic version of the official labeling should provide a link to
the agency web site and its section on risk signals.
149. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(7) (2007).
150. See id § 201.57(c)(6).
151. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.56(d) (2007). For an illustration of the form, see PHYSICIAN'S DESK
REFERENCE 2111 (58th ed. 2004).
152. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, sec. 915,
§ 505, 121 Star. 823, 957 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(r)(1)).
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E. Disclosures About Risks Found in Medical Reviews
1. Risk Signals Found in Medical Reviews Based on Clinical Studies to
Support Approval
The labeling or web site should identify the risk signals found by medical
reviewers based on clinical studies done at the time of approval or submitted to the
FDA to support a new use for a marketed drug. The risks found in Vioxx
demonstrate the need for such measures." 4 The medical review done when the drug
was initially approved noted the frequency of cardiovascular findings in various
studies and the need for a larger database to answer whether the risk was increased.
The postmarket VIGOR study for Vioxx was intended to demonstrate an added
benefit of the drug, but, according to the FDA's medical review, there was an
increase in cardiovascular effects at a high dose in the clinical tests compared to an
existing drug.'55 When a drug is already on the market, there is a special need for
disclosure, even if the FDA and the drug's sponsor are still negotiating whether a
warning or other action is needed.
This proposal would require disclosure of the factual and scientific findings
made in a medical review of a clinical test submitted to obtain initial approval or
to support a new approved use after the drug is on the market. The disclosure would
be listed as a risk signal if the FDA does not dispute the finding when the drug is
approved.' 56 In the case of a review of a study to support a new use for a marketed
drug, as occurred with the VIGOR study for Vioxx, any disclosure would be
delayed for two months after the completion of the medical review to permit the
agency to consider whether the factual findings need to be corrected. The time for
including the report in the labeling could be extended for an additional two months
but only if authorized in writing by the Commissioner of the FDA. Requiring action
by the Commissioner would provide greater assurance that there is a legitimate
need for delay and that there is a commitment by the agency to a timely resolution.
The disclosure should be listed under a heading for Risk Signals in the new
postmarket Safety Information Web Site'57 that the agency will be establishing, if
it is not included in the physician labeling. If the agency disagrees with the finding,
the agency's disagreement should be described.'58
154. See discussion supra Part lI.B.2.
155. See id. When the assessment in the review is based on a meta-analysis, the finding would be
included in the risk signal section, unless the agency disagrees with the finding in which case a
summary of the disagreement would be given as discussed in the following section.
156. On the other hand, if the FDA disagrees with the assessment, the finding in the review and
the reason for the disagreement would be listed in the summary described below.
157. Sec. 915, § 505, 121 Star. at 957 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(r)(2)). The agency can
include "other material determined appropriate" on the web site. Id. at 958 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(r)(2)(B)(vii)).
158. In case of disagreements, an alternative would be to include the medical review findings and
the agency's position with the summaries in the web site rather than in a section on risk signals.
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2. Summaries of Medical Reviews for Approved Drugs and Postmarket
Safety Reviews
Under the new law, summaries of "critical issues" for drugs identified in
medical reviews at the time of approval by all disciplines 5 9 will be made available
on the agency web site after the drug is approved. 60 No changes can be made in the
review by supervisors' 6' but disagreements can be noted.'62 Because the summaries
are to include issues identified by all disciplines, 6 ' issues raised by drug safety
officers will also be noted. These provisions help to address the concerns raised in
hearings before Congress that the FDA does not give enough weight to the findings
of the office concerned with drug safety when the drug is approved.'64
The availability of medical review findings has been particularly controversial
in the case ofpostapproval safety reviews and observational studies. 6 5 The agency
has generally maintained that medical reviews are "predecisional" and that they
may contain errors that, if disclosed, might lead fewer people to use a beneficial
drug.' 66 In the agency's view, the staff assessments of the studies should be released
only "on a case-by-case basis."'67 The wider range of the issues about disclosure of
medical reviews is beyond the scope of this Article, though, and the
recommendation discussed above looks at disclosures about medical reviews of
clinical studies at the time a drug is approved or a new use is sought.
F. Risk Potential of Newly Approved Drugs and Consumer Advertising
1. IOM Recommendation
Given the limits of testing and postmarket surveillance, the 10M makes the
notable recommendation that the agency conduct a comprehensive review of the
data on a drug's safety and efficacy no later than five years after the approval of a
"new molecular entit[y]."'16 The 1OM also recommends that the label and
promotion to physicians contain a symbol or designation for newly approved drugs
159. Sec. 916(3), § 505(1), 121 Stat. at 959 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355 (1)(2)(C)(iv)).
160. Id. (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(1)(2)(A)(i)).
161. Id. (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(1)(2)(D)).
162. Id. (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(1)(2)(C)(iv)).
163. Id.
164. See S. Finance Comm. Hearing, supra note 42, at 163.
165. See Gardiner Harris, Potentially Incompatible Goals at the FD.A., N.Y. TIMES, June 11,
2007, at A14 (reporting that officials responsible for drug-safety were "punished or ignored" after
recommending a boxed warning for the diabetes drug Avandia and now advocate a timeline of one to
two months for an agency response to safety questions); see also Gardiner Harris, F.D.A. Remains
Unsettled in Wake of New Questions, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 2007 at A14 (reporting tensions between
those who approve drugs and those who track postapproval safety).
166. FDA'S RESPONSE, supra note 102, at 14.
167. Id. Furthermore, the agency will make only the final agency review available. Id.
168. See 1OM REPORT, supra note 4, at 12.
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to indicate that the full risks of the drugs are not presently known.'69 The IOM
further advises a moratorium on advertising of prescription drugs to consumers in
the initial years of sale so that physicians may gain information about a drug's risks
as that information becomes available. 
170
2. Mixed Congressional Response on Consumer Advertisements for
Newly Approved Drugs
The new law provides for a periodic reassessment of newly approved drugs in
the years after approval.' 7' While not designated as a comprehensive review, the
reassessment may serve a similar role. Unfortunately, Congress did not adopt the
moratorium on consumer advertising recommended by the IOM because it was
concerned that the measure would not meet the heightened constitutional protection
provided for commercial speech.'72 This concern illustrates the powerful influence
such constitutional protections have on FDA-regulated products.'73
In the absence of a moratorium, the IOM suggests that any consumer drug
advertisement discloses that the data related to the new drug's risks and benefits
"are less extensive than those related to alternative products that have been in use
for a longer period."' 74 The IOM suggests the use of a symbol to convey this
message after a study had been done on the most appropriate symbol to be used.'7
The new law does not provide for such a disclosure and instead only provides for
a report to Congress on the use of a symbol to designate newly approved drugs in
the labeling and in consumer advertisements.'76 While a symbol may be enough in
the physician labeling, a textual statement would certainly be more helpful to
consumers, and the agency should recommend that advertisements for newly-
approved drugs contain a disclosure that the risks from such drugs are not fully
known.
169. Id. at 11 12.
170. Id. at 11.
171. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, sec. 901(a),
§ 505, 121 Star. 823, 923 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(3)(A)-(B)).
172. See 153 CONG. REC. S5764 (daily ed. May 9, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (stating that
senators had concerns about the constitutionality of a moratorium, even when limited to extraordinary
circumstances and had therefore reached a compromise that did not impose a moratorium but instead
provided for "strong safety disclosure").
173. See Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 377 (2002) (holding that the prohibition
on advertising and soliciting prescriptions for compound drugs in the Food and Drug Administration
Modernization Act of 1997 to be an unconstitutional constraint on commercial speech); see also IOM
REPORT, supra note 4, at 159-62 (discussing cases in which FDA attempts to regulate consumer
advertising have been challenged as unconstitutional). However, the Court's decision in Western States
is of little relevance because the drugs there did not pose the same safety risks: the drugs were not
widely used; and their risks were discoverable without postmarket surveillance. See Margaret Gilhooley,
Drug Regulation and the Constitution After Western States, 37 U. RICH. L. REV. 901, 917-21 (2003)
(discussing the FDA's policy for regulating consumer advertising after Western States).
174. IOM REPORT, supranote 4, at 171.
175. Id. at 171 72.
176. § 904, 121 Star. at 944.
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3. Prereview of Direct-to-Consumer (DTC) Advertisements
Congress did take an important step to reduce the risk of deception from DTC
advertisements by authorizing a prereview oftelevision advertisements. The agency
can require changes in the advertisements if it determines that specific disclosures
are needed to prevent the advertisement from being "false or misleading.' 77 After
a formal hearing, the agency may impose civil monetary penalties of up to $250,000
for broadcasting an advertisement that is false or misleading. 178 Any party who
wishes to dispute the decision may seek judicial review. 179 The requirement for a
prereview may still face constitutional challenges, but it may be permissible
because regulation of false or misleading commercial speech is acceptable. 8 '
4. Elimination of Consumer Reminder Advertisements
Under the FDA's guidance for DTC ads, drug manufacturers should identify
important risk information in the ads. 8' However, the risk information need not be
provided if the DTC ad is a "reminder" ad,'82 which is an ad that gives the product's
name but not its use."' Reminder ads permit sponsors of a drug like Vioxx to run
DTC ads without making the same disclosures about risks ordinarily needed in
advertisements broadcast to consumers. Reminder ads may be appropriate for
doctors who have ready access to drug labeling and are more familiar with the
drugs, but consumer advertisements should disclose the risks the drugs pose and not
provide only a partial message.'84
177. Sec. 901(d)(2), § 503, 121 Stat. at 940 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(e)(2)).
178. Sec. 901(d)(4), § 303, 121 Stat. at 940 41 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 333(g)(1), (2)).
179. Id. at 941 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 333(g)(6)).
180. See Va. Pharmacy Bd. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 72 (1976)
(upholding regulations that prohibited the use of false and misleading advertisements). Health claims
on foods and supplements are also subject to prior review, even if such claims may be constitutionally
protected. Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F.3d 650 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
181. See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: CONSUMER-DIRECTED
BROADCAST ADVERTISEMENTS 1 (1999), available at http://www.fda.gov/cder/guidance/1804fnl.pdf.
The current law requires that prescription drug advertisements contain a "brief summary" of the drug
risks in accordance with FDA regulations. 21 U.S.C. § 352(n) (2000). Until regulations are issued with
respect to consumer broadcast advertisements, the FDA has issued guidance documents to identify
acceptable approaches to complying with the regulatory provisions. For ahistory ofthe FDA's guidance
on DTC advertisements, see FDA Notice: Consumer-Directed Promotion of Regulated Medical
Products; Public Hearing, 70 Fed. Reg. 54,054, 54,055-56 (Sept. 13, 2005).
182. See supra note 139.
183. Reminder ads are permitted by regulation in promotion to physicians. 21 C.F.R.
§§ 201.100(f), 202.1(e)(2)(i), 801.109(d) (2007). The new law allows the regulations on drug
advertisements to be issued through a less formal rulemaking process than had previously been required.
Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, sec. 901 (d)(6), §502(n),
121 Star. 823, 941 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 352(n)).
184. The agency should also reexamine the need for patient labeling for advertised drugs given
Americans' lack of awareness of patient labeling and the 1OM's recommendation to establish an
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G. Authority for Labeling Disclosures
If the FDA were to require more disclosures about the risk signals, there may
be an issue as to the source of the agency's authority to require such disclosures.
This section surveys the agency's authority to require labeling authority and its
relationship to these disclosures. The law requires drug sponsors to provide
"adequate warnings against ... unsafe dosage or ... duration of administration"
that are necessary for the protection of users.'85 The FDA can also require the
labeling to contain both information whose absence would make the labeling
misleading by failing to reveal material information'86 and information about
material consequences of use.'87 These provisions justify providing information to
physicians about the potential for significant risks, which could affect their
assessments of whether the drug is safe. Moreover, the safety of the drug is not fully
established in the testing done to support drug approval, even though the sponsor
has a continuing burden to show that the drug is safe.' 88 Physicians should have the
benefit of any good indicators of potential risks that are available to supplement
their understanding of the safety of the drug. Finally, the disclosures better equip
the physician to obtain the patients's informed consent to the drug's use. Drug
labeling has long provided information about adverse events as a way to inform
doctors about risks posed by drugs that are only discovered postmarket.'89 The
agency derives its authority to require drug labeling from its authority to require the
sponsor to establish records and report data, obtained through clinical experience
or otherwise, that are relevant to assess the propriety of continued marketing. 90 The
risk signal information suggested here serves as an extension of the adverse event
reporting by highlighting notable risks that physicians should watch for in assessing
patients' responses to a drug. Providing information about these risk signals to
physicians would also address the loss of public confidence in the safety of drugs
that are discovered to have risks known to the FDA and drug sponsor but not
disclosed to physicians.' 9 '
185. 21 U.S.c. § 321(n) (2000); see also Alliance for Bio-Integrity v. Shalala, 116 F. Supp. 2d
166, 178 (D.D.C. 2000) (deferring to the FDA's determination as to whether the definition of
"materiality" includes consumer interest, consumer safety, or both).
186. § 321(n).
187. 21 U.S.C. § 352(a); see also Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n. v. FDA, 484 F. Supp. 1179, 1183 86 (D.
Del. 1980), aff'dper curiam, 634 F.2d 106, 108 (3d Cir. 1980) (upholding requirements for providing
certain drug risk information to patients because the warnings were material with respect to
consequences of use).
188. See § 355(d)(4) (providing that a drug can be disapproved based on the application or other
evidence if there is "insufficient information to determine whether [the] drug is safe"); see also
§ 355(e)(2) (providing that a marketed drug can be withdrawn if the evidence available in the
application or new evidence "shows that [the] drug is not shown to be safe").
189. See 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(7) (2007) (discussing the scope of required warnings about
possible adverse reactions).
190. 21 U.S.C. § 355(k).
191. See Bright, supra note 2.
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Of course, if the present law does not provide adequate authorization to require
disclosures of risk signals such as these, a legislative change should be considered.
There may be constitutional limits, though, on the ability of a legislature to require
labeling if the disclosure is made merely to satisfy the consumers "right to know"
or public curiosity.192 The disclosures proposed here serve to prevent deception and
should not be subject to such a restriction on Congress's ability to require labeling.
VI. FDA PREEMPTION POLICY: DRAWBACKS AND ALTERNATIVES
Highly contentious issues arise in deciding whether a warning concerning new
risk information needs to be added to the labeling of marketed drugs and, in turn,
whether the agency must agree to the change in advance. The answer affects the
scope of liability of drug companies, which can be enormous. This Part begins with
an overview of the FDA's existing rules on providing warnings and the provision
in the new law that refers to authorized changes without prior approval. This Part
goes on to describe the agency's position given in its 2006 Preemption Statement.
A number of cases are pending that test the agency's position, 193 and the Supreme
Court has invited the Solicitor General to file a brief expressing the views of the
United States on a petition for certiorari in a case in which the underlying issue is
whether FDA regulation is minimal.'94 This Article, however, does not address the
legal aspects of preemption directly.
This Part also considers the merits of the FDA's Preemption Statement with
respect to ensuring the accountability of the agency, reinforcing the drug sponsor's
responsibility to take initiative to reduce risks, and providing access to factually-
supported risk information. This Part suggests that the agency reconsider and
withdraw its present Preemption Statement. Then, this Part proposes that the agency
provide for Disclosure Determination Petitions from the drug sponsor if there is
uncertainty about the need for a warning. The petitions would be disclosed as under
review after a limited assessment period in a process similar to the proposal
regarding potential risk signals discussed above.' 95 This Part finally addresses the
merits of this approach as compared to the approach detailed in the agency's
192. Int'l Dairy Foods Ass'n v. Amestoy, 92 F.3d 67, 73 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that the
consumer's "right to know" is not a substantial governmental interest that justifies a restriction on
commercial speech (quoting Int'l Dairy Foods v. Amestoy, 898 F. Supp. 246, 249 (D. Vt. 1995))
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
193. See, e.g., Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078, at 24 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006)
(challenging a finding that state common law liability for the use of an FDA-approved label does not
present "an obstacle to federal objectives"),petitionfor cert.filed, 127 S. Ct. 2451 (May 21, 2007) (No.
06-1249); Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that a negligent
manufacturing claim is not preempted merely because a medical device adhered to standards upon
which it gained FDA approval), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3000 (2007).
194. Levine, 127 S. Ct. 2451 (2007); see also cases cited supra note 29 (discussing issues pending
before the Supreme Court on the preemptive effect of FDA regulations).
195. See discussion supra Part V.E.1.
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Preemption Statement, and then concludes by discussing the issues these
approaches raise.
A. FDA Regulation of Criteria for Warnings and Changes Without Prior
Approval
Drug sponsors are required to report serious adverse events to the FDA within
fifteen days of the event's occurrence. 96 The FDA's regulations for warnings about
risks in physician labeling provide as follows: "In accordance with [section]
314.70... , the labeling must be revised to include a warning about a clinically
significant hazard as soon as there is reasonable evidence of a causal association
with a drug; [however,] a causal relationship need not have been definitively
established.',
197
Section 314.70 generally requires manufacturers to obtain the agency's advance
approval for changes in the drug's labeling. 198 However, the rule also permits
Changes Being Effected (CBEs) immediately that are made to "add or
strengthen.., a warning" to be added to the label simply by providing notice to the
agency. 9 9 The effect of this provision is to allow for possible products liability
claims for a failure to warn of risks that the FDA has not required or approved.2 °
B. FDA Preemption Statement and Regulatory Change in the Final Rule
1. Need for Preemption
In the preamble to a rule that revised the format and content of physician
labeling, the FDA endorsed a broad view of the need for preemption of products
liability. This Preemption Statement is based on the authoritative regulator model
and emphasizes the agency's "statutorily prescribed role as the expert [f]ederal
agency responsible for evaluating and regulating drugs."' ' According to the
agency, state tort actions can "encourage, and in fact require, lay judges and juries
to second-guess the assessment of benefits versus risks of a specific drug" and
create "pressure on manufacturers to attempt to add warnings... [and] to propose
'defensive labeling' . . . , which, if implemented, could result in scientifically
unsubstantiated warnings and underutilization of beneficial treatments. 2 2 The
196. 21 C.F.R. § 312.32(d)(3) (2007). The information reviewed by the drug sponsor in making
a report may come from scientific literature, postmarketing studies, or any source obtained by the drug
sponsor. Id. §§ 312.32(b), (d), (e).
197. § 201.57(c)(6)(i).
198. § 314.70(a).
199. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii)(A). For a discussion ofthe CBE provision, see Jonathan V. O' Steen & Van
O'Steen, The FDA Defense: Vioxx® and the Argument Against Federal Preemption of State Clainsfor
Injuries Resultingfiom Defective Drugs, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 67 (2006).
200. See Osbum v. Anchor Labs., Inc., 825 F.2d 908, 911-14 (5th Cir. 1987).




Gilhooley: Addressing Potential Drug Risks: The Limits of Testing, Risk Sign
Published by Scholar Commons, 2008
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
agency further maintains that state tort actions encourage a "misunderstanding" that
"FDA labeling requirements represent a minimum safety standard," even though the
FDA interprets the law as creating "both a 'floor' and a 'ceiling' ... [for imposition
of liability] if the additional statement[s are] unsubstantiated or... misleading." 203
The FDA also identified the limited role it saw for CBEs, explaining that
whether labeling revisions are necessary is, in the end, squarely
and solely FDA's [determination] under the act. A manufacturer
may, under FDA regulations, strengthen a labeling warning, but
in practice manufacturers typically consult with FDA before
doing so to avoid implementing labeling changes with which the
agency ultimately might disagree (and that therefore might subject
the manufacturer to enforcement action).
As a result the agency found that "at least" a number of claims would be
preempted by the CBE provision, including tort suits based on a failure to provide
a "statement" in the labeling, "the substance of which had been proposed to FDA
for inclusion in labeling, if that statement was not required by FDA.
20 5
2. Procedural Issues and Puzzling Regulatory Change in 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70
The agency also made a puzzling change in the final rule that seems to
minimize the use of the CBE process for substantive warnings and to have done so
in a way that raises procedural issues. In a convoluted revision in the procedures for
making changes, the FDA has precluded any changes in the Highlights section that
are made by the CBE procedure other than editorial changes such as removal of a
provision from the "[r]ecent major changes" section.20' The preamble to the
Preemption Statement explains that, because of the importance of the Highlights
section, the agency revised Section 314.70 to require sponsors "to obtain prior
approval of any labeling changes to Highlights, except for editorial or similar minor
changes.'20 7 The Physician Labeling Rule, though, expressly states that the new
Highlights section in the labeling shall include "[r]ecent major changes" to the "full
prescribing information" in the labeling, including warnings "that contain[]
substantive labeling changes that have been approved by the FDA or authorized
203. Id. at 3,934 35.
204. Id. at 3,934.
205. Id. at 3,935 36.
206. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.70(c)(6)(iii) (providing that changes in the Highlights section in 21
C.F.R. § 201.57(a) must be made pursuant to section 314.70(b)(2), which requires prior approval ofthe
agency, except for changes made under section 314.70(b)(2)(v)(c), which are changes that either
remove a listing or change a date).
207. See Preemption Statement, supra note 26, at 3,932.
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under [Section] 314.70(c)(6)," the very provision that authorizes CBE changes
without the FDA's prior approval.2"8
If this change in the final rule is intended to limit the type of changes that can
be made by the CBE procedure to those that are merely editorial, it would seem to
be not only inconsistent with the text but also to be a significant change. Such a
change would warrant a reproposal of this aspect of the rule to provide notice and
an opportunity for public comment.20 9 This is especially so because the proposed
rule raised concerns about products liability only with respect to whether the
proposed Highlights section could increase liability rather than with the need for
limits generally.21 °
C. State of Litigation on Preemption
The courts are split on whether the assertion of preemption is consistent with
FDA regulations and whether an FDA assertion of preemption is entitled to
deference.2 ' A district court found the FDA's preemption position inconsistent with
the affirmative obligation of a drug manufacturer under the CBE regulation to add
warnings as soon as there is evidence of a reasonable association between use of a
208. 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(a)(5) (2007). Subsection (a)(10) ofthis rule provides for a "summary of
the most clinically significant" warnings. Id. § 201.57(a)(10). The full prescribing information about
the warnings is given later in the labeling as provided for in subsection (c)(6). Id. § 201.57(c)(6).
209. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2000); Natural Res. Def Council v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 279 F.3d
1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding the EPA needed to make another proposal when the changes
represented "a fundamental policy shift"). While general statements ofpolicy can be issued without the
use of notice-and-comment rulemaking, the statement must not be binding, a matter not considered here.
See § 553(b)(A) (2000).
210. Requirements on Content and Format of Labeling for Human Prescription Drugs and
Biologics; Requirements for Prescription Drug Product Labels, 65 Fed. Reg. 81,082, 81,086 (Dec. 22,
2000). The statement of the potential impact of the proposed rule on federalism also stated that the
proposal "does not preempt State law." Id. at 81,103.
211. Compare Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 97 n.9 (2d Cir. 2006) (expressing
doubts about the degree of deference due to the FDA preemption statement in a field where no
presumption against preemption applies), andJackson v. Pfizer, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 964, 968 (D. Neb.
2006) (rejecting the position of the FDA and finding the state consumer protection laws did not thwart
the FDA's goals), and McNellis v. Pfizer, Inc. [2005-2006 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH)
17,351, at 62,781 83 (D.N.J. Dec. 29, 2005) (granting leave for interlocutory appeal and rejecting the
FDA's position on preemption), with Colacicco v. Apotex, Inc., 432 F. Supp. 2d 514,537-38 (E.D. Pa.
2006) (upholding the application of the FDA preemption policy).
In some cases, courts have considered whether the agency has made a specific determination on
the warning at issue. See, e.g., In re Bextra & Celebrex Mktg. Sales Practices & Prod. Liab. Litig.,
[2005-2006 Transfer Binder] Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 17,543, at 63,752-53 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16,2006)
(finding preemption of failure-to-warn claims when the FDA had determined that the evidence before
the agency did not support the warning sought). A district court refused to accept a similar argument
with respect to antidepressants in an earlier dispute. See Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1085,
1099-1100 (C.D. Cal. 2000). On appeal, on a separate issue the Ninth Circuit did not address the
preemption issue because of the physician's failure to read the drug label. Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358
F.3d 659, 660-61 (9th Cir. 2004), affg 196 F. Supp. 2d 984 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
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drug and adverse side effects.212 The FDA's position has also elicited both
support21 and objections and reservations"' in legal commentary. Earlier articles
have examined the appropriate place for regulatory compliance in dealing with
postapproval risks.
2 15
The Supreme Court is considering granting certiorari in Levine v. Wyeth,216
where the Vermont Supreme Court found that tort liability did not conflict with
federal law or goals, FDA regulation was minimal regulation, and the FDA
Preemption Statement was unpersuasive and did not warrant deference.2 The
Court has also agreed to examine the FDA's express preemption provision for
212. See McNellis, Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) at 62,779.
213. See Howard L. Dorfman et al., Presumption of Innocence: FDA 's Authority to Regulate the
Specifics of Prescription Drug Labeling and the Preemption Debate, 61 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 585,
615-21, 622 (2006) (analyzing cases and concluding that "the public policy balance weighs in favor
of a uniform federal scheme"); Epstein, supra note 35, at 1 ("[F]ederal preemption of state tort actions
for pharmaceuticals is long overdue, both under current law and as a matter of sound legal policy.").
214. See William Funk et al., The Truth about Torts: Using Agency Preemption to Undercut
Consumer Health and Safety, CENTER FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM WHITE PAPER, September 2007, at
1, 2, available at http://www.progressiveregulation.org/articles/Truth Torts 704.pdf (arguing that
federal preemption of common law tort cases would damage the rights of consumers and patients to
recover damages); David A. Kessler & David C. Vladeck, A Critical Examination of the FDA's Efforts
to Preempt Failure-to- Warn Claims, 96 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2008), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/
georgetownlois/papers/2/ (commenting on the FDA's efforts to convince courts that failure-to-warn
cases are preempted by federal regulation); Nagareda, supra note 35, at 4-5 (urging the use of the
availability of preemption as an instrument to bolster the predicates for preemption with the FDA
process); O'Steen & O'Steen, supra note 199, at 69 ("[P]olicy considerations favor abandoning the
doctrine of preemption as applied to drugs and medical devices regulated and approved by the FDA.");
Catherine M. Sharkey, Federalism in Action: FDA Regulatory Preemption in Pharmaceutical Cases
in State Versus Federal Courts, 15 J.L. & POL'Y 1013, 1017 21 (2007) (noting a decline of the
regulatory compliance defense and the critical role of federal agencies which may make them the
"driving force" behind the federal-state disparity inpreemption determinations); Catherine M. Sharkey,
Preemption by Preamble: Federal Agencies and the Federalifation of Tort Law, 56 DEPAUL L. REV.
227, 228, 258 59 (2007) (examining the "momentum towards" increased use of preemption by federal
agencies and the corresponding court deference to agency determinations).
215. See Michael D. Green, Statutory Compliance and Tort Liability: Examining the Strongest
Case, 30 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 461, 496-97 (1997) (noting the reasons why postmarket surveillance
should be required); Robert L. Rabin, Reassessing Regulatory Compliance, 88 GEO. L.J. 2049, 2079,
2084 (2000) (finding that the defense of regulatory compliance has "virtually no relevance" for risks
found postmarket and may need to be "case-specific"); Richard B. Stewart, Regulatory Compliance
Preclusion of Tort Liability: Limiting the Dual Track System, 88 GEO. L.J. 2167, 2167, 2186 (2000)
(maintaining that an ALI proposal on regulatory compliance is "sound and should be implemented" but
pointing out that the proposal only provides for compliance preclusion for those risks that "specifically
have been addressed and regulated by the administrative program").
216. No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078 (Vt. Oct. 27, 2006),petitionfor cert.filed, 127 S. Ct. 2451
(May 21, 2007) (No. 06-1249).
217. Id. at 32-34. The Court has asked for the Solicitor General's views on the petition for
certiorari. Levine, 127 S. Ct. 2451; see discussion infra Part VI.E for further discussion of this case and
the relevance of the Preemption Statement.
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medical devices and how it applies to tort liability.218 While there is no similar
provision governing drugs, there is always the prospect that the Court's decisions
in these cases may have broader implications.
D. Relevance of the Legislative Provision that New Authority Is Not to
"Affect" the CBE Rule
The new law gives the agency express authority to request labeling changes to
reflect new safety information and to order such changes after a dispute resolution
process.219 Fines can be imposed for violations and failure to obey the order can
lead to the imposition of civil monetary penalties. 220 The law provides that this new
authority "shall not be construed to affect the responsibility of the [sponsor] ... to
maintain its label in accordance with existing requirements," including 21 C.F.R.
§ 314.70,221 the provision that permits CBE changes without prior agency review.222
According to a newspaper report, a rule of construction was sought by House
Democrats and plaintiff lawyers who believed the reference to the responsibility of
manufacturers to "maintain" their labels would weaken preemption as a shield
against products liability.223
E. Policy Reasons for Reconsidering the Preemption Statement
The aim of this section is to examine the preemption debate and the alternative
approaches from a policy perspective. The discussion suggests that, even without
regard to any legal difficulties encountered with the Preemption Statement, the
FDA should withdraw the statement and develop a new approach because of the
statement's policy-related drawbacks. These drawbacks relate to the limited
accountability for agency inaction, the lack of an incentive for drug sponsors to
consider making various necessary changes, and the lack of public information
about the basis for the sponsor's and the agency's positions. These drawbacks are
illustrated by looking at the impact of preemption under the agency's policy like
218. See Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 451 F.3d 104, 106 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct.
3000 (June 25, 2007) (No. 06-179); see also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Hears Medical Device
Case, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2005 at C3 (reporting concern voiced by some Justices during the oral
argument about shielding manufacturers before the FDA had learned of a risk or took action).
219. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, sec. 901(a),
§ 505, 121 Star. 823,924-25 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(A)-(G)); see discussion supra Part
IV.B.2.
220. Sec. 902(b)(1), § 303(f), 121 Stat. 823, 943 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 333(f)(4)).
221. Sec. 901(a), § 505, 121 Stat. at 925 26 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4)(1)).
222. See supra note 199 and accompanying text.
223. Anna Wilde Mathews et al., Bill Raising FDA's Powers Nears Passage, WALL ST. J., Sept.
20, 2007, at A6.
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that presented by Vioxx. The Levine case224 is also instructive on the policy issues
whether or not the Supreme Court reviews the case.
1. Accountability of the FDA
The first reason the FDA should consider developing a new preemption policy
is that the agency does not have to make a decision or publicly disclose the
situations in which its policy will prevail. Preemption can involve inaction by the
agency if "the substance" of the warning sought in the liability suit had been
"proposed to FDA for inclusion in labeling" by the drug sponsor but "that statement
was not required by FDA. 225 Indeed, it seems that preemption might even occur
when the sponsor opposes the agency's efforts to obtain a warning, such as when
there were long negotiations over the warnings needed for Vioxx." 6 The scope of
the coverage presents other questions as well. For example, would a routine change
to the list of adverse events be sufficient to count as the "substance" of a warning
about a risk and one that had been "proposed"?227 Is the substance of a statement
proposed if it is only oral, and will there be any record of the specific warning the
sponsor sought? Would the length of the negotiations between the sponsor and the
agency be relevant? If the agency is to be accountable, it needs to make a decision
as to whether any warning or disclosure is needed or, at a minimum, make public
that it is still deciding the issue. The current policy expressed in the Preemption
Statement fails to provide this level of accountability.228
2. Reinforcing the Sponsor's Responsibility
The FDA's preemption policy erodes the incentive provided by the threat of
liability that holds drug sponsors responsible for examining the necessary steps that
should be taken to reduce risks associated with the use of their drug. Under the
FDA's preemption policy, the sponsor's responsibility is determined by the FDA's
decision to press for a change that exceeds what the sponsor may have proposed,
rather than by what a reasonable sponsor would propose to reduce a drug's risk.
The sponsor should have to identify why a more stringent warning, including a
boxed warning, is not needed.
224. 2006 WL 3041078, at 23 (finding more warnings needed about the risk of amputation from
inadvertent insertion of a push injection into an artery, and regarding an alternative raised by the
sponsor and not accepted by the FDA as "different, but not stronger").
225. See Preemption Statement, supra note 26, at 3,936: see also discussion supra Part VI.B. 1.
226. See discussion supra Part II.B.3.
227. 153 CONG. RE(. S5764 (daily ed. May 9, 2007) (statement of Sen. Kennedy).
228. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837 38 (1985) (holding that an agency's decision not
to institute proceedings is not actionable "unless Congress has indicated otherwise").
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3. Physician Access to Information
The Preemption Statement does nothing on its own to provide physicians with
access to important new risk concerns, such as the cardiovascular risks associated
with the use of Vioxx found in the VIGOR study.229 Of course, the new law
strengthens the agency's enforcement authority, which should facilitate its ability
to obtain information and make it easier to take enforcement action against drug
sponsors that fail to provide physicians with adequate warnings. 2 0 However, the
implementation of the expanded authority depends upon the issuance of new
regulations and guidance.23' As a result, ensuring that there are adequate disclosures
about pending issues continues to be important.
4. Consultation Process and Better Information: Lessons from Levine v.
Wyeth
Under its preemption statement, the FDA encourages drug sponsors to consult
with the agency about the need for labeling changes.232 As illustrated by Levine,233
these consultations may involve letters from the drug sponsor about a proposed
change that involve subtle differences in the wording that can lead to different
assessments about whether they represent a strengthened warning.234 The drug
sponsor maintained that the FDA's decision to retain the original warning
preempted a tort claim that a stronger warning was needed.235 The dissent
maintained that the sponsor's proposal gave the opportunity to the FDA to consider
the adequacy of the warning in general.23 6
The sponsor's proposal, though, was not well adapted to that broader aim.
There is no clear indication, for example, about what level of increased risk had
prompted the drug company to believe a change was needed or whether the sponsor
raised the need for a stronger warning, or even a boxed warning. The Levine case
also involved a malpractice suit against the provider.237 When a drug sponsor is
aware of malpractice suits or settlements that relate to the risks from the
administration of a drug, this information should be available in some form. In the
229. See discussion supra Part ll.B.2.
230. See discussion supra Part V.G.
231. See discussion supra Parts 11.B.2, C.
232. See Preemption Statement, supra note 26, at 3,934.
233. Levine v. Wyeth, No. 2004-384, 2006 WL 3041078, at 10-13 (Vt. Oct. 27,2006) (finding
FDA regulation to be minimal when the sponsor proposed a change that the court viewed as different
but not stronger, with the FDA stating, with no explanation, that the present labeling should be
retained),petitionfor cert.filed, 127 S. Ct. 2451 (May 21,2007) (No. 06-1249) (requesting the Solicitor
General's views on granting certiorari).
234. For example, the retained warning stated the need to use "extreme care" in the opening
sentence. The proposed change did not. See Levine, 2006 WL 3041078, at 4 n. 1.
235. Id. at 6.
236. Id. at 56.
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future, drug sponsors may also need to raise whether further surveillance or a risk
mitigation strategy is needed.238
The company's request and the agency's response seem to have been matters
of private communications without any provision for public disclosure. The practice
of consultation resembles the petition process discussed below in terms of its effect
but without the means to provide public access to the decision in a way that can
reinforce the manufacturer's responsibility and the agency's accountability. To
address these concerns the consultation process should have the safeguards
discussed below when the process is intended to have the agency determine that
products liability is preempted.
F. Disclosure Determination Petition Process to Balance the Drawbacks of
Preemption and FDA Concerns
1. The Role for Petitions
The FDA has justified preemption because of its belief that warnings about
unsubstantiated risks would discourage use of beneficial drugs.239 If sponsors could
add disclosures without approval by the FDA, warnings would be provided merely
to avoid liability.24 Thus, the FDA believes it has a responsibility to ensure the
labeling provides sound and useful advice to practitioners about the risks.24'
An approach that balances the FDA's concern over these drawbacks with the
need for accountability, reinforcement of the sponsor's responsibilities, and access
would be for the agency to establish a petition process through which the sponsor
could request the agency to determine the need for labeling changes about a
potential risk. Under this approach, the CBE rule would remain in effect and
immediate changes under the existing criteria would continue to be appropriate.
If the sponsor is unsure whether a warning is needed, the sponsor should have
the option of filing a petition with the FDA to have the agency both determine what
disclosures should be made and confirm that no immediate warning or CBE change
is needed.242 The request should be accompanied by an identification of the risk
information, the proposed warning or other disclosure, and a description of any
additional surveillance or studies believed necessary. If the agency does not act on
the matter within a limited time period, the matter should be listed in the physician
labeling, or a linked agency web site in a section clearly designated for risk signals.
The process would build on that discussed above for disclosing risk signals found
238. See discussion supra Part IV.A-B.1.
239. See Preemption Statement, supra note 26, at 3,935.
240. See discussion supra Part V1B. 1.
241. See Preemption Statement, supra note 26, at 3,935.
242. The FDA regulations already provide for the filing of citizen petitions. 21 C.F.R. § 10.30
(2007). The proposal here would go beyond the existing process by permitting drug manufacturers to
file petitions adapted to this circumstance and identifying the support the petition needs and by
identifying the subsequent steps involved, including the designation of the matter in the drug labeling
or a linked web site as a matter "Under Review."
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in medical reviews.243 In response to the petition, the FDA would determine
whether any warning is needed and whether follow-up studies or monitoring should
be done. Requiring the FDA to respond specifically to the petition would increase
the agency's accountability. If the FDA decides that no warning is needed, the
labeling or agency web site should reflect the decision.244
On the other hand, the sponsors may believe that information about a
potentially serious risk from a marketed drug is sensitive information and that the
agency should determine its response before any public disclosure is made.245 This
concern may be fueled by the impact public disclosure may have on the drug's
stock market price. This issue again raises the question of whether the FDA is an
authoritative gatekeeper for risk information or whether, as this Article suggests,
physicians should have access to risk signals about emerging risks under review,
such as the ones the VIGOR study on Vioxx indicated, before the agency has
completed its deliberations.246
Using this petition process can have advantages as well as disadvantages for
a drug sponsor. The petition process can provide protection against products
liability when used to identify the need for disclosures in the face of uncertainty.
The emergence of new issues is illustrated by the agency's willingness to require
a boxed warning based on a meta-analysis of a risk for a marketed drug.247 While
the sponsor may gain protection from liability, the FDA may want the sponsor to
provide more information, or even encourage a clinical outcome study to clarify the
risk.248 The caution the FDA required for Vioxx after the results of the VIGOR
study were revealed249 may yet prove a model for a minimally adequate disclosure.
That statement acknowledged the unknown significance of the new risk
information, the lack of a study to resolve the issue, and the need for caution before
use by those most at risk.25 °
243. See discussion supra Part IV.E.1 (examining disclosures of risk signals found in medical
reviews); see discussion supra Part V.G for the agency's authority to require disclosures.
244. After a period of time, it may be appropriate to provide the information in summary form or
in an archive. The web site forthe agency's guidance documents, which includes archived material, may
provide a useful format. U.S. Food & Drug Admin., Guidance Documents, http://www.fda.gov/
CDERlguidance/ (last visited Oct. 16, 2007).
245. The FDA has the authority to close advisory meetings to the public in certain circumstances.
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
246. See discussion supra, Parts ll.B.2, V.E.
247. See Press Release, U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Adds Boxed Warning for Heart-Related
Risks to Anti-Diabetes Drug Avandia (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2007/
NEW01743.html (describing agency's decision after considerable evaluation to strengthen a warning
about a risk based on a postmarket meta-analysis); see supra note 165 and accompanying text for issues
about Avandia raised by medical reviewers.
248. See Psaty & Furberg, supra note 131 (examining the value of long term-trials).
249. See discussion supra Part IJ.B C.
250. See discussion supra Part ll.B.3.
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2. Effect of Using the Disclosure Determination Petition Process and Its
Benefits
When a sponsor uses the Disclosure Determination Petition process to request
a determination of the need for a warning, the designation of the matter as under
review and the agency's resolution should have preemptive effect and constitute an
adequate warning under state law. The process could also lead the sponsor to
provide more support for the petition and even make commitments for follow-up
monitoring. This process would thus encourage "the industry to act
affirmatively.., to provide the kinds of information within its control that are the
logical postulates of a preemption-worthy federal policy.,
25'
If the sponsor does not use this petition process, the determination of whether
a warning or a change to a warning is warranted under the CBE rule should remain
where it has been, along with the potential for products liability. However, the
manufacturer may still be able to maintain that a disclosure is preempted under the
judicial preemption standards.
If the sponsor has already informed the agency of the underlying risk
information, the filing of a specific petition and the agency's review significant
to provide an agency-backed preemption-may seem superfluous. But the petition
would have a significant impact: the petition would call the agency's attention to
the relevancy of the issue as it relates to tort suits, and the petition would lead to
increased public visibility and greater agency accountability. The sponsor would
be taking the initiative in identifying the information needed, and, in practice, the
agency may have less of a burden in negotiating with the sponsor to obtain a change
in labeling. In its petition, the sponsor should address why the statement proposed,
as opposed to a stronger warning, is appropriate. Additionally, the public
availability of the petition could encourage the sponsor to resolve pending issues
with the agency. The trade-off for more protection from liability for the drug
sponsor should be greater public availability of information about pending
emerging risk issues. This process may appear to give the agency too much
leverage; however, the decision to file a petition would remain with the sponsor,
and the drug sponsor would continue to receive the procedural protections provided
in the law in the event of disputes.
2 52
3. Relevance of "Fraud-on-the-FDA "Liability and the Petition Process
Another issue is whether tort liability would be imposed, notwithstanding the
use of the petition process, if a drug sponsor failed to provide or misrepresented the
information that the FDA used for its review. In Buckman Co. v. Plaintiff's Legal
Committee,253 the Supreme Court permitted preemption of a liability claim where
251. Nagareda, supra note 35, at 54.
252. See supra notes 119 20, 124 and accompanying text..
253. 531 U.S. 341 (2001).
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a fraudulent misrepresentation led to the approval of a medical device.254 The Court
concluded that a fraud committed against a federal agency is not a traditional area
of state responsibility and that such a theory of liability would impose significant
burdens on the agency. 255 The Second Circuit found Buckman not applicable to tort
liability cases, a traditional area of state responsibility; however, the matter remains
disputed, and the Supreme Court has recently decided to review the issue.256 The
FDA's Preemption Statement may also create a hurdle for such suits because
products liability claims would be preempted "unless FDA has made a finding that
the sponsor withheld material information relating to the proposed warning"257 -a
test that suggests that it is up to the FDA to determine the effect of withheld
information.
A related issue is whether the availability oftort liability for misrepresentations
would "swallow up" any general review process that would otherwise limit
liability.258 The aim of the Disclosure Determination Process, suggested here, is to
encourage drug sponsors to raise issues in a transparent way when the need for a
warning is not clear and to provide the FDA with information relevant to an
informed decision. If the FDA establishes this process, the FDA should address
what should happen if a sponsor fails to provide all the information that the FDA
identifies as needed or misrepresents the information. The preemption protection
should clearly end if the FDA finds these deficiencies. In addition, the preemption
protection might also end if the deficiencies and their materiality could be
determined in a lawsuit without the need for any agency input with the resource
burdens that that would involve. The agency should also consider whether the risk
of high punitive damage awards 259 would dissuade sponsors from using the petition
process if tort liability could be revived. One possibility might be to consider limits
on punitive damages. 260
254. Id. at 343 44.
255. Id. at 347, 351.
256. Desiano v. Warner-Lambert & Co., 467 F.3d 85, 98 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. granted sub. nor.
Warner-Lambert Co. v. Kent, 128 S. Ct. 31 (Sept. 25, 2007) (No. 06-1498).
257. Preemption Statement, supra note 26, at 3,936.
258. See Nagareda, supra note 35, at 52; see also Epstein, supra note 35, at 10-14 (discussing
various intrusions by tort liability into federal preemption).
259. See generally Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 127 S. Ct. 1057, 1063-64 (2007) (holding that
harm to others may not serve as an independent basis for the award of punitive damages and thus
retreating from earlier decisions that permitted that factor to be included in the jury's calculation in
awarding punitive damages); Linda Greenhouse, Justices Overturn $ 79.5 Million in Punitive Damages
Against Philip Morris, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 2007, at A14 (reporting that, while the punitive damages
award was overturned on procedural fairness grounds in Philip Morris USA v. Williams, the members
of the Court have diverging views on the use of substantive due process to limit punitive damage
awards).
260. See Nagareda, supra note 35, at 51-52 (arguing that preemption should create a "bounty for
information disclosure by [the] regulated industry" to the FDA and that the prospect for punitive
damages serves as a "powerful inducement for investment" by "well-capitalized plaintiffs' law firms"
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G. Overall Assessment of the Disclosure Determination Petition Process
Some may criticize this Disclosure Determination Petition process on several
grounds. One concern may be that the process would still unduly reduce the
incentive, currently provided by the prospect of products liability suits, for drug
companies to respond to safety issues. The listing of a risk as under review may
also seem too minor and uninformative to count as a factor that affects preemption.
On the other hand, the proposal to list risk reports as under review might be seen
as tantamount to a warning, and one that could unnecessarily alarm physicians and
discourage beneficial use of the drug. The under review designation, though, is
aimed at indicating only that the matter has not been resolved. Another concern
could be that the drug sponsor may view the information as confidential
information that should not be publicly disclosed until the agency reaches a
decision on the need for a warning. However, that position turns on the value of
having public access to information about an agency decision when the effect could
be to preempt the availability of a traditional remedy for recovery of damages for
injuries from drugs. Moreover, the drug sponsor need not use the Disclosure
Determination Petition process, choosing instead to rely on the ordinary judicial
tests. Despite these criticisms, the approach suggested here has advantages over the
other alternatives because it would encourage the drug sponsor and the agency to
address through a public process the need for warnings regarding emerging risks
in debatable cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
One aim of this Article has been to supplement the authoritative expert model
for determining the disclosures that should be made about drugs risks with an
access model that provides information about the limits of testing and about
emerging risk information. These disclosures should describe the limits ofthe initial
testing, the use of surrogate endpoints for approval, and the status of postmarket
testing or postmarket surveillance that may significantly affect safety assessments.
In addition, physicians should have ready access to information about risk signals
that have been discovered in medical reviews of clinical studies for drugs when
approved or when a new use is sought. Providing these disclosures informs the
physician of a relevant issue and can encourage the agency to address its
significance rather than leaving it unresolved.
The other major concern of this Article is that the agency's new preemption
policy can insulate drug sponsors from products liability in a way that can affect the
scope of warnings about emerging risks made on the physician labeling and do so
without sufficient public acknowledgment. This Article recommends that the
agency change its policy and provide instead that if a drug sponsor seeks a
definitive determination by the agency with preemptive effect on the need for a
warning, the drug sponsor file a petition with the agency seeking that action. The
sponsor's petition should provide adequate disclosures on the scope of the risk that
the sponsor believes exists. The physician labeling, or linked web site, should list
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the existence of a petition as being under review until the agency responds to the
petition. The agency's action on the petition would be publicly available.
The proposals made in this Article for disclosures that there are limits to testing
and that a petition to determine the need for a warning is under review may be seen
as inappropriate. Arguably, such disclosures could lead physicians-out of a
concern about potential risks that have not been definitively established-to
prescribe fewer drugs that have important benefits. On the other hand, the best
evidence to determine the existence of a risk is a controlled study, but the scope of
the testing done by the sponsor when the drug is approved is limited, and the
available postmarket information may not be sufficient to determine the
significance of emerging risks. Assessing the seriousness of the potential risk in this
setting involves matters of judgment. But that judgment needs to be publicly
exercised to provide the accountability that physicians and users of drugs rightfully
expect.
Doctors are trained to be able to balance risks, benefits, and uncertainty. While
it is true that disclosing potential safety risks could decrease use of a drug whose
benefits may outweigh its risks, not disclosing the existence of risk signals with
reasonable support may result in physicians being underinformed about the
potential risks of a drug that may outweigh its benefits. The underlying policy
choice is between relying solely on the agency as the authoritative decisionmaker
to determine the significance of potential risks and providing physicians with access
to information about important risk signals.
If the agency's current preemption policy remains in place, and important risk
signals are not disclosed in some manner, there is also the risk that the public may
begin to see the agency as a shield that protects the pharmaceutical industry from
liability. The expansion of user fees to fund agency personnel and safety-related
activities26' may also influence the public's perception about the scale of the
industry's influence over the agency.
A final point should be made about the significance of user fees in shaping the
future of FDA regulation. The new law represents the most important expansion of
FDA authority since the Drug Efficacy Amendments were signed into law by
President John F. Kennedy in 1962.262 President George W. Bush, a conservative
261. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, sec. 105, ch.
VII, 121 Stat. 823, 840-42 (to be codified at 21 U.S.C. § 379h-2).
262. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat. 780 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). Earlier federal food and drug regulations were signed into law by
progressive Presidents: President Theodore Roosevelt signed the first law in 1906, Pure Food and Drugs
Act of 1906, ch. 3915, 34 Star. 768 (repealed by the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938),
and President Franklin D. Roosevelt signed into law, along with many other food, drug, and cosmetic
regulatory schemes, the requirements for premarket approval of drug safety in 1938. Federal Food,
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President, signed this law but did so with little ceremony.263 While the law
strengthens the agency's substantive authority, the agency's ability to use that
authority in key areas requires further efforts to establish the governing procedures.
In practice, the scope of the FDA's new powers is likely to be determined by the
next administration.
The new legislation is a compromise shaped not only by the safety issues raised
by the history of Vioxx but also by the periodic need to renew the user fees that
provide the major source of funding for the salaries of the agency's medical
reviewers. The division of power between the political parties in Congress and the
President will affect whether the renewal of the fees is routine or leads to a
reevaluation of the agency's mission. The FDA, the drug companies, and those in
the political branches of the government will inevitably be mindful of the timing
and forces that can alter the agency's mission and powers. The effect of user fees
on the regulatory process and the means of providing accountability for major
agencies certainly warrants continued study.264
263. On the FDA's web site, there is a picture of the signing ceremony with Secretary Leavitt of
the Department of Health and Human Services, Commissioner von Eschenbach of the Food and Drug
Administration, and Congressman Joe Barton of Texas standing behind the President. Noticeably absent
from the picture are the congressional leaders who actually sponsored the legislation. FDA, Law
Strengthens FDA, http://www.fda.gov/oc/initiatives/advance/fdaaa.html (last visited November 6,
2007).
264. Margaret Gilhooley, The Administrative Conference and the Progress of Food and Drug
Reform, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 129, 133-35, 140-41(1998) (summarizing the changes made when user fees
were renewed in 1997 and discussing the need for a group like the earlier Administrative Conference
to study the impact on the regulatory process of the "funding sunset" represented by user fees).
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